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Recently, Congress, the li t e:r-ary c om.'''] IJDity, ond the 
publ ic at large hav e come t o re consider th e wa:r- on drugs. 
There ar e many op i n ions regarding alternot i ves t o this 
pseudo war or new measures t o be ta:oten in the war effort, 
but t he o ngoing effort itself has escaped evaluat i o n ( t o 
determine if the Unit e d States i.s winning th is campaign ). 
Th e intent of this thesis, then , is to e xp l ore the 
objectives of the war on drugs, and to determine i f Amer ica 
is winning . 
This work concludes t ha,- the current drug war is 
f ail i ng. The emphasis (supply o r demand) and :...he 
methodology ( i n t erdic tion, e t c . ) need t o be reconsid ered; 
and, a new p l an which ha s th e support of poli t ica l a nd 
enfor cement leadership must be ma de - - its objectives sho u ld 
be made c l ear , and its g oa l s s hould be meaningfu l , 
measureable a nd achieveable. 
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EXECUTIVE S UMMARY 
Recently , Congress, the l iterary conununity , a nd the 
p ub lic a t l arge have come t o recon s i de r t h e war on drugs . 
There a re many o pi nion s regarding altern atives t o this 
pseudo war or n ew measu res t o be taken in the wa r effor t 
( such as medi caliza t ion and lega liz a t i on), but the ongoing 
e f f ort itse lf has e scaped eval ~at io n (to det e rmin e if the 
United States is wi nning thi s campa ign). 
Pharmaceutical treatments have thus far bee n 
unsuccessfu l in solving t he addictio n p r o b l em, the r e fore 
medicalizat ion is not t h e likely so lut ion. Thi s approa c h , 
in f ac t, wou l d further tax a n a l ready ov er - taxed medical 
system. Whi l e l ega l ization s quashed the profitabili ty and 
allure o f boot legging in the pos t -prohibitio n era , th e U. S. 
i s not prepared t o embrace it a s a so l ut ion t o the drug 
prob l e m. conseque ntly, counter-dru g e f f orts c ontin ue to 
follow t he same bas i c cou r se o f action (with occasio na l 
modif i cations which do no t s i gnif icantly alter the o v erall 
effort) . 
From the prevai ling a tt itudes, it s eems that, like 
Vietna m, nobody wants to f ight in <:.hi s war and, it s eems , 
nobody want s t o wi n it (if · ..... inning is poss ible). 
The intent o f this thesis , t hen, is to exp l ore t he 
ob jectives of the war on drugs, ar:d t o determlne if America 
':s w'::ming. 
The biggest question posed by this thesis is "who's 
winning?" the dr-ug war-. On the who l e, I wou l d have to say 
that t he dr-ug tr-afficker-s are winning. They r-emain flexib l e 
and innovative which precludes them from getting bogged down 
in the same str-ict constraints which i nhibit U.S. efforts. 
This work concludes that the current drug war is 
failing. The emphasis (supply or demand) and the 
methodology (interdiction, etc.) need to be reconsidered; 
and, a new plan which has the support of pol i tical and 
enforcement leadership must be made- - i t s objectives should 
be made clear, and its goals should be meaningfu l , 
measureable and achieveab l e. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A . GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Congre s s ha s expre s s e d the desire, in a r ecent budget 
proposal, t o cut th e coun::er - d rug budget. l Ove r t he p a s t 
decade , th e U.S . has a c tively p a rticipa-::ed in the war o n 
d r ug s , b ut there a re no cle ar ind i cators th a t lY e are win n i ng 
this war . Fr om this, I hav e d r awn the conclus i on that as 
f a r a s Congres s is concern e d we are not winn ing t he wa r o n 
d r ugs s o let's get out . If this is the case, then, they a re 
n o t a l o ne . Walte r Cronki te r ecently s p oke out a ga i nst the 
d rug war, s aying, a s o the r s have said , that i t "is a 
f a i l ure . .. 2 Judge James P. Gray , a Cal ifornia tria l judge, 
co ncurs. 3 
Does b uild i n g more prisons i nd i cate t hat l a w 
enfo r c e ment is s ucceedi ng? La w enfo rcemen t is a rresti n g 
more people , d a ily , o n drug- r elat ed matters. More dru g 
k i ngp ins a r e tu r nin g thems elves ir. than ever before , a nd a 
lo t of d rugs hav e be e n seized s i n c e war was declared on 
dr ugs . But , interd i ctio n itself has s uch a sma ll i mpa c t 
that it · s see n by d r ug traf f ickers as just anot her cos t o f 
doing b u s i n e s s. And, increasir.g ly, ne .... ' member s join t h e 
iReducing The Defeeit, p.200. DOM-58 discusses reducing fimding for Law Enforcement 
efforts to control illegal drugs 
2Hilton, p.4D. In this article, Hilton reviews a Discovery Channel episode featuring 
Walter Cronkite. Cronkite draws a c<lmparison between the war on drugs and Vit.'tnam 
JaTay, J.P ., p. l 
drug game, taking the p l ace of those who have surrendered, 
been a r rested or killed. 
The drug war as a whole is fraught with problems which 
stem from ill defined, amorphous objectives; politization of 
efforts and r esults; difficulty in identifying the enemy; 
too many chiefsj conflicting intelligence estimates ; lack of 
sufficient prior planning and mobilization ; and the setting 
of constraints in washington (restrictive rules of 
engagement) which tie the hands of the field commander and 
preclude capture and or eradication efforts from succeeding. 
As was the case in Vietnam, "the national behavior [has 
shown] a tendency to premature war- weariness and precipitate 
disenchantment with a po l icy which [has resulted in] a 
stalemated war . ,,4 From the prevailing attitudes then, it 
seems that, like Vietnam, nobody wants to fight in this war 
and, it seems, nobody wants to win it (if winning is 
possible) . 
The intent of this thesis is to explore the objectives 
of the war on drugs, and to determine if we are, indeed, 
losing this pseudo war. In doing so, I will attempt to 
answer the following questions : How do we measure success 
in this war? How do we objectively define failure? What 
are the indicators of success/failure? Additionally, the 
4Summers, p.39 
ro l e of Congr ess, the mi l ita r y, the p res s, the pub l ic, a nd 
l aw e nforcement in the succes sjfailu.::.-e o f t he pert i nent 
po l icies will be rev iewed. 
Thi s is a n import ant area o f study beca u s e it could 
serve t o re-d irec t the course of action taken in t he wa r o n 
drugs. If no t hing e l se , perhaps it wi l l open a f e w eye s to 
the r ea l ities of the drug war and prompt the establishment 
of an investigative comroic:tee which cou ld furthe r study t his 
wa r and al t e rnat ives to it. 
B. BACItGROUND 
What d rives the mi l itary'S involvement i :1 d rug 
interd i ct i o n? In the b rief study, which fo l lows, I ha ve 
stipulated a model f or (see Figure 1 . 1 ), and examined the 
deve l opme nt o f, the mil i tary'S counter- narcot i c r ole . 
aids i n t h e understanding of t h e driving f orces behind 
mili tary involvement in c o unc:er-narcotics operations and t he 
existing risk t o U.S. economic and poli~ical stability. Th e 
study will illus"tra te t hat it was in answer to publ ic 
o ut c ry, i n all l e vels of society, t hat the national 
government decl a red il legal drugs to b e a t h reat t o nati o nal 
security. Later developments resulted in the military being 
o!IIs s i gned the lead agency ro le in detection and monitoring. 
Driving Forces Model: 
Figure 1.1 
An increase in narcotics flowing into the United States 
drives an increase in drug use/crime. S This leads to public 
outcry which causes local and state governments to increase 
their attempts to thwart the drug problem and leads to 
incr eased complaints to, and requests for assistance from , 
the national government. This, in turn, drives national 
policy and forces policy-makers to declare a "war on drugs" 
(as a risk to national security) thereby enabling the use of 
:1i3. ;~ional assets (the military) to combat this scourge. 
A 1 :.owing for non - linearity, public outcry could also be 
'1i."wed C'.s a driver of national policy (in the form of 
Political A<.;tion Committees) and a driver of drug use, in so 
far as some people use illegal drugs i n rebellion against 
public opinion. In this same manner, national policy a nd 
5JohnsOn, B., p.187. A study done by Johnson, Wish, and Anderson (narcotic and drug 
researchists) illustrates the drug-crime linkage where the "income from specific crime 
events [were shown to have been] primarily expended upon drugs, particularly expensive 
drugs." 
local/state rea ctio n interac ts wi th drug us e /crime . Since 
d r u g use and crime i nc rea s es a re perc e ived by the nationa l 
gov e r nment a s a threat t o na t i o n a l sec urit y, interaction 
be twe e n t hese vari a b les is o bvio us. Reac t i o n at the l o c a l 
and s t a t e l evel is a l so a ffec t ed by t he polic ies p u t into 
action b y the f e d e ra l gove rnme n t (ie. new a n t i-d ru g l aws to 
be enf orced a t th e l oca l and state government leve l s). 
P ublic o u tc r y may also o c c u r in respo nse to natio na l 
policies whi c h r e q u ire publ i c invo lvement in combating t h e 
d ru g p r o blem (ie. a i d to r e habilitation programs). For e a s e 
in co l lec t ing s t a tisti c s, ho wever, a l inear relat i o ns hip 
(whi c h b est expresse s the relat ionship b etwe e n the 
va r iabl e s) is a s s umed . 
A fac t or wh ich shal l b e c o ntro lle d for is milita ry 
ava ila bi l i t y . When the military is n o t othe r wise e ngaged 
(i e . not involved in a pro tracted armed c o r-fl i et, s uc h a s 
Wor l d Wa r II, Korea, o r Vietnam) i t is avai l able f o r n ew 
non- t r a d i tio nal missio ns - - would even vo l untee r f o r them--a nd 
i s , t her efore , availabl e for use in domest ic issue s 
otherwise handled by other agen c ies (such as d;:ug 
in terdiction normall y handl ed by th e Drug Enf o rcement Agenc y 
( DEA»). c o nsequently, military avai l ab i lity is assumed t o 
be a c onstant . Additionally, this s<:.udy addresses the 
concepts o f dru g use a nd publi c ou t cry as drivi ng f o r ces 
behind military involvement without exploring the behavioral 
factors which prompt drug use or public outcry. 
In 1981, legislation was enacted · .... hich authorized the 
military to loan equipment and support to law enforcement 
agencies involved in anti - drug work. President Ronald 
Reagan recognized that the violence and corruption 
accompanying the drug business tends to destabilize source, 
transit, and demand countries, and on April 8, 1986, he 
signed a Nat i onal Security Directive designating the 
international drug trade as a nationa l security issue. 6 
The drug problem is evident even in our nation's 
capital. Washington D.C. 's anti-drug program conducts about 
70 ,000 drug screens pe r year, testing each sample for five 
drugs. 7 Thirty percent of the juvenile arrestees in D.C., 
over seventy percent of the adult arrestees, and even higher 
numbers of probationers, have drug problems. 8 Seventy-two 
percent of the juveniles testing positive, and sixty-six 
percent of the adults, are positive for cocaine. 9 The 
outcry wh ich these facts prompt is, perhaps, best 
represented by a statement given before the u. S. senate 
Judiciary Committee by Fred B. Ugast, Chief Judge - - Superior 
Court of the District of Columbia . 
6Mabry, p.3 
7U.8 . Senate Review, p.146 
8fbid., p,146 
9fbid., p.146 
Drugs and "10lence appear to be overwhelming the just ice systems of our 
nat ion's major (;jl ies Al though I would agree that eaeh city has the 
responsibility for rcsponding to its own emergency situations, I would 
submit that no city is capable of responding alone to the dmg crisis we are 
all facing. The federal government must share in the funding of a 
comprehensive and coordinated response to the problem 10 
In Ap:::-il 198 8, t he iiO llse 11.r:ned Servic es Co='--:::tee 
an no unced , anc. b e gan, a funda:ne:ltal ::-e-exalT.~r:ati():l of t:'le 
;::-ole 0 ': t he i~.ilitilry ir. dn.:g in:::erdictior:. This was 
fo ll owed, ~n 1989 , b y a cor.gres s:onal dec l aration t ha t 
il lic i t drug tra~fick ing was a threat to :lat: o nal security. 
1 989 l egis l ati o n assigned the Depar:.ment of Defense ( DOD) 
re sponslb':l ity fo!." d etec t i o n a:1C mor.i:::orir:g. Consequ er:t l y , 
joi n t ta s k forces we:::-e ::ormed tha:. included U. S. Na vy a nd 
Coas:. Guard s h i p s, a irc ra f;:; anc personnel dedicated :::0 
s t oppi ng the ir.':lc.x o f ille gal dr'Jqs ir::to our cou nt r y .I I I r. 
keeping with tt>.e mi litary's lead age:lcy role f o:- detection 
and monito r ing, 1990 l egislatior: stip;.!lated t ha t the :JOD 
cou l d operat e e quipment to i n;:;ercept vessels or a i rcraft 
de t ec t ed o uts i de th e United S-:.ates in o::-der to identl ::y and 
cOllUllu nicate with suspect vesse ~s or a i reraf;:;, and di::-eet 
t hem t o p r oceed to l ocat ions desig na t ed by the app::-opriate 





To test the driving forces model, an observation p l an 
was set up for a twelve year time span (1980 to 1992). 
Rather than measure a ll of the variables, only four were 
chosen for measurement. The bold print, in this section, 
indicates the variables which were chosen for measurement 
(primarily due to the availability of data). (see Table 1 
of Appendix A) 
Drug Flow = (Drugs s <! ized " Drug i mports )13 
~ Drug Crime = (Dru g r f'l"ted c ri rr.e I Tot"l cri:ne) 14 
Public Outcry = (Drug reh. t e d editorial ~ / Tot a l edito ri<!ls )15 
Local/State Reac-;:io" = (D rug enforceroent resources / Tot a l r e sources ) 
New N<!t ional Policy = (Drug rel a ted policy debates/ 7TL p<>licy deb,, -;: f's) 
Military Involvemront = ( DOD Dng b"ciget I Tot al DCD budget) 1 6 
13Three different sources were required to gather this data. Data for 1980, 1987, and 
1988 was unavailable. The figures for drugs seized and imported for 1981 through 1985, 
and drugs seized for 1986, were obtained from Reuter, Peter, p.66 &74. The figures for 
drugs imported in 1986 were obtained from GAO, p.39. Finally, the figures for drugs 
seized and imported from 1989 through 1992 were obtained from O,'l'OCP 
14Crime statistics were gathered from ~~ oftbe , lojted States and 
The World Almanac examining the total number of drug arrests per subject year as 
compared to the total number of arrests for each year 
15Thc New york Tjmes Index was used for indicator.~ of public outcry. The number of 
drug-related editorials was matched against the total numher of editorials 
16Figures for the DOD drug budget were taken from OMB, p.IO-30 and Reuter. Figures 
for the total DOD budget were gathered from the Repon oflbe Secretary of Defense 10 
the president Bod Ihe Congress 
Data a nalysis consisted o f two multip l e r egres sio n 
ana l yses using the d ru g f low, % drug c rime, and public 
o utcry variab les ( independent var iables ) agai nst mili t a r y 
invo l vement (depe ndent var iabl e). The differen c e b e t wee n 
the two mult i p le r egres s i ons is the time per iod consid e red 
( t o f ocus on the difference, if any, between the y ear s 
before and the years a fte r th e military became actively 
involved in the drug war). A simple regr e ssion analysis was 
done to t est the relat i o nship be t ween drug crime and publ i c 
o utcry . Additionally, using t he ANOVA bar p lot fu ntion, 
these f Ollr variables were evaluated by each year . 
Resu lts o f the d riving forces study : Interpretat i o n of 
t he mult i p l e regress ion (see Appendix A) suggests that t he 
relations hips between dru g flow, % d rug crime, p ub lic 
outcry, a nd military i nvol vement are due to chance. 
However, g i ven other research and literature, I believe that 
the hypothesis i s s t il l co rrect . Given that t~e military 
initially became invo lved in t he drug war i n t~e 19 8 5 to 
1 989 t ime fr ame, the per iods from 199 0 t o 1989 o n the 
independent variabl es are the most s ignif icant , .... hen 
answering the qu estion "what drives t he military ' S 
involvement in drug inte r dict ion? " . A multipl e regr e ssio n 
analysis (Appendix A ) which excludes the years a fter the 
mi litary became act ively involved ( 1990 to 199 2) indicates 
that the relationship between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable is not due to chance . 
The simple r egression of drug crime versus public 
o'-J.tcry (Appendix A) indicates a mod e rate relationship 
between cha nges in drug crime levels and changes in public 
o utcry levels . ConseqJ.:.ently , it can be inferred that an 
increase in % drug crime does drive an increase in public 
outcry, so that the model holds at these test points . 
The bar plot for drug flow (Figure 1 . 2) shows a general 
increase over the years for which the information "./as 
available (from 1981 to 1986 and 1989 to 1992) . 
Drug Flow into the U.S. 
(seizures/imports =drug flow) 
O.3[ 
~.~«" •••• 1 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
• Percent Drug flow 
Figure 1.2 
1.11l 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
The overall observable pattern in the plot is similar 
to tha t in the % drug crime plot (Figure 1 . 3), al t hough % 
drug crime falls off after the 1989 peak . Given the general 
pattern, it might be inferred that an increase in drug flow 
led to inc::-eased drug crime. 
10 
Drug Crime in the U.S. 
(druQ arreslsltll arres1s) 
O.15if 
:::lJlIU,-adUJllutJJ 
19801981 19821983198419851986 19871 98819891990 199 1 1992 
• % Drug crime 
Figure 1.3 
The bar p l ot for % drug crime shows that after a peak 
in 1989, % drug c rime set;tled down to moderately high 
l evels. The measure o f drug crime is based o n drug a rrests; 
co n s equ e ntly , t he decrease in drug c rime may be due to a 
change in policy ( i e . a s hift in f ocus from arresting "t h e 
rna!]. o n the s tr e et" to arresting his supplierldealer-- l e ss 
arr e sts , but hig her pay-off) ,17 
'J' he bar plo t f or publ ic o utcry (Fig:lre 1. 4) shows a 
peak in 1986, 1 98B, a nd agai n in 1989 where i :: r eached i t s 
hig hest p eak and was followed by a decrease. pos sibl e 
reason s for the decrea s e in publi c outcry , after i t s last 
peak, are : apathy, a shift in media focus, and public 
I700J Fact Sheet, Sep 1994, p.3, "The eviden(;e indicates that drug use,s are more likely 
than nonusers to commit crimes, that arrestees and inmates were often under the intluencc 
of a drug at the time they committed their offense, and that drug trafficking generates 
violence." 
I I 
perception that the "drug problem" ""as being handled, in so 
far as the suppliers and dealen:; are being dealt with . 
Public Outcry 
(drug reI. edits/ltl edits) 
O_j . I 0.020 
0.01 5 . 
O.01O j _ . . : :.::I......J.Ib~ 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
• Public Outcry 
Figure 1.4 
It should he noted, that there is a one year lag between the 
ini tial high peak. in drug flow and drug crime occurring in 
1985 and the first high peak in public outcry (1986). 
Lastly, the bar plot for military involvement. (Figure 
1. 5) shows a gradual increase from 1982 to 1988 follo'Ned by 
a significant increase in the years 1989 to 1992, This 
occurrence coincides with the implementation of new national 
policies on milit.ary use in drug interdict.ion. (see, also, 
Figure 1 .6) 
12 
Level of Military Involvement 
(DOD drug budge1!tt l DOD budget) 
• % Mil . Involvement 
Figure 1.5 
Level of Military Involvement 
(DOD dl'tlg budgetfTTL fed dl'tlg budget) 
~I~ 111111 dill. II 
1981198219831984 19851986 1987 198819891990 1991 19921993 19941 995 
• % Mil. Involvement 
Figure 1.6 
Fo r t h e most part, the trends in Fig"ure 1. 6 follow that 
of Figure l .5 - - alt hough Figure 1 .5 views t.he percenta g e 
within the military by us ing i t s c ounter-drug allot.me!lt 
match e d against its own total budget, and Figure 1.6 v~ews 
the perc entag e as on e of many agenc i es receiving money (by 
using mo ney al l o tted t o the military matched against the 
total f e deral drug budget). 
13 
Overall, a cursory look at the bar graphs reveals a 
roughly l inear relationship between al l of the variables 
during the 1 980s. However, in the early 1990s, a continued 
i ncrease in drug flow and military involvement can be seen; 
whereas, there is a decrease in drug crime and public 
outcry. If the trend had continued upward, rather than 
decreasing from 1993 to 1995, i t cou ld have been basis for a 
new hypothesis in the 19908. 
Given that not all security risks are military in 
nature, "transnational phenomena such as narcotics 
trafficking a l so have security imp l ications for both present 
and long-term American policy." 18 Since the United States' 
nationa l concerns include: (1) credibly sustaining security 
with mili tary forces that are ready to fight, (2) bolstering 
America's economic revitalization, and (3) prorr,oting 
democracy abroad, the narcotics trade is not on l y a threat 
to American national security, but also to hemispheric 
security. 19 Given that the U.S. seeks to spread democracy 
and create/maintain a stable political environment in this 
hemisphere, drug trade (which promotes political or economic 
instability in Latin America) threatens the security of the 





security we re limit.ed t o mi l i ta ry matt e rs , ill i cit drug use 
is a threat · because people addicted t o d rugs do n ot r:lake 
reliabl e so l d i ers, sailors , a irmen or ma rines . 2 1 Give n that 
t h e U.S . must ma inta in a s t and i ng milita r y f orce, and be 
ab l e to expand it in t irae of war, it can i ll afford a 
habitu a ted poo l o f personnel. 22 The U. S. aims to el iminate 
drug t rafficking, bot h bilate rally and r egional l y , b e c ause 
it poses a serious threat to ou r sec u r ity and t o democ r acy 
as a whole. One way in wh ich drug traffi ckers can b e 
stopped i s by d enying t hem an i nfra s tructu!'e i n wh i c h to 
operate. Proponents of sub stant ia::'ly increasing t he 
mi lita ry ' s role a rgue t hat only the mili t ary is equ ipped and 
has the resources to coun t er powerfu l tra::£icki ng 
organizations, a nd that drug interd ic t ion operations can 
p r ovi de realist ic trai ning and be conducted wit hout 
substantia l imp act on military readiness. 23 
Given some i dea as to ho w they became involved, a nd 
that t he mi l itary is now invo l ved in t he drug war, how 
s ucc essfu l i s the milit ary and the nation as a whole ? The 
r emaining c hapters will attempt to answer this question . 
The following c hapter, i n fact, \olill addres s the indicators 
or success/ra i lure and how they might be meas u red . 
21Thid_, p.3 
22Thid " pA 
23 0??, p.v 
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II . CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS 
What is the r o l e of the publ i c , at l arge, in 
de t e rmining the te:cms and measures of success or f a ilu r e in 
Ameri c a 's wa r o n dru g s? Thi s chapter will endeavo r t o 
ans wer this questio n . However , the main objec t i ves o f t h is 
c hap ter are : ( 1) t o o b jectively define succes s/failure ; (2) 
t o s elec t indicators of sl: ccess/fai l ure; ( 3 ) t o dev e lop a 
me a n s o f measuring t hese indica-:ors; and, (4) to o bj ective ly 
a scertain s u c c ess/failur e of the counter-drug war, 
A. DEFI NITI ON OF SUCCESS / FAI LURE 
Accor ding t o Webster's New Wo.,.- l d Dj ct jonary, Second 
Colle ge Ed i tion , .f.a.i.l.lu:..e is "a falling short" (not a c h i eving 
o ne's objec tives ). ~5li. is then defined as "a favo r a bl e 
o r satis fa c t o r y ou t come - ( achieving on e 's ob j ec-:ive s). 
Bearing these definitio ns in mind , t hen, i t might be 
use f ul , t o co n s i d e r what the objec t ives of different 
admin istrat i o n s have b e en; whether c ivilian and mi l i t ary 
agencies have s hare d the same o b j ectives ; if, and/or how , 
differ ent adrninistrat i o ns have measured success/fai l ure; a nd 
whether count e r -narco tics act i vities have a c hieved the 
desired objectives. If o nly some, rather than a l l, of the 
o bjectives a r e achieved is t he operation still successful? 
This q uest ion st; resse s t he import ance of pre - established, 
c lear , meani n gful, measuI"eable and achievable ob j ectives 
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(which requires that mutually agreed upon objectives be put 
in place), Tactical and operational objectives should 
enable the ac hievement of the overall strategic objectives. 
INDICATORS OF SUCCESS/FAILURE 
Indicators ''''hich will be considered while evaluating 
the counter-drug program, are: education/awareness of the 
drug problem; attitudes toward drug use/crime; policies and 
characteristics of enforcement; organization and cooperation 
of agencies involved; and reporting practices. If the 
attempt to quantify the drug war is successful, then the 
indicators will show the area of success/failure in this 
ongoing campaign. Any inSight gained from this process 
could aid policy-makers in re- focusing counter - drug efforts 
in order to alleviate, or overcome, present weakenesses , 
C, MEANS OF MEASURING THE INDICATORS 
In collecting data for, and developing a means of 
measuring the indicators of, drug war success/failure, it is 
necessary to try to break the indicators down into their 
component parts. 
Awareness = number persons reached I ttl # people 
Attitude = indifference to harm I ttl opinions expressed 
IS 
Enforcement "" # drug policies enforced I ttl # drug policies 
Cooperation "" # missions with other agencies I ttl missions 
Reporting Practices '" # arrests for drug-related offense / tt l arrests 
0_ MEASUREMENT/EVALUATION OF THE INDICATORS 
Where possib le, t he means of measurement specified for 
each indic at o r was utilized; however, due to the data 
avai lable , some of the indicators ar e eva ] uat ed in a 
diff erent manne r . 
1 . Awareness 
With respect to the education/awareness indicator , 
t here ar e advertisement s ( newspapers and magazines) and 
television commerc i als (such as those paid for by the 
Partnersh ip f or a Dr ug Free Amer ica) ; police programs (such 
as PAL--California' s Police Ac<:iv i ties League- - which 
provides camping t rips and o ther activities designed to k e e p 
kids away from drugs and out of t roub l e); and, there a re 
school lecture programs (in - class instn:ction by teachers, 
or school a ssemblies taught by heal th and poli c e 
professionals). The main idea behind t his approach is that 
education leads to aware ness and awareness leads to a change 
in atti tude and thus behavio r. The actual data on t h e 
numbers o f ads shown , over the period of tile drug war, was 
not readily avai lable due to inco nsistenc ies in numbers of 
a ds/commercials provided to the l ocal te l evision s t ations 
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over the years and the short prograrruuinq cycles (6 month 
periods) at these stations. The local stations ha d no idea 
regarding counter-drug spots--beyond those in the current 
cycle . Only one station (KCCN) was able to track how many 
of their corruuercial spots were counter-drug related (two out 
of t hirty-seven) . 24 According to KCCN' s trafficker, each 
spot is expected to reach 200,000 people. 25 
Although the desired data is not readily available, i t 
is assumed that, given their expected reach, t he ads do have 
a role in shaping public perception. Consequently, 
newspaper editorials and polls, which ask what t he rr,ost 
importar,t problems in America are, enable the gauging of the 
awareness indicator. (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) 
Representation of Public Awareness 
(based on number of editorials) 
% 0.02 O.03~ 1 ~:~ : . • ele~ 
1~119~1983198419851~1~19Ml~19901M11992 
Year 
• Public Outcry 
Figure 2. ]11 
24KCCN is a CBS affiliate serving the Monterey Bay area 
25This number, provided by the commercial trafficker, is based on the number of 
households with T.V.s in the viewing area (Monterey Bay). 
liThe data for this figure, utilized in Chapter l, was drawn from the New York Times 
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As seen here, and :"Ientioned in Chap t. er I, there is an 
i n i t i a l pea k in pub lic awa r eness in 1986, fu l lowed by a 
dec r ease in 1987, t h en peaking again in 1988 and 198 9 before 
once aga in decreasing . These peaks coincide with re newed 
dec l a r at ion s o f the war against drugs . 
Most Important Problem Po ll 
D~t e of Pa il 
• Percent mentioning drugs. drug IIblise liS most important problem 
Figure 2.2 
Ind.ex (#drug edits/ttl edits '" public outcry) 
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According to public perception, as illustrated in Figure 
2.2', drugs are no longer one of the biggest problems facing 
our country. The highest peak in the public's perception of 
drugs as one of this nation's most important problems, 38 
percent, occured in November 1989 (bordered by the next two 
highest peaks which occured in May 1989, 27 percent, and 
April 1990, 30 percent). These peaks in awareness of the 
drc;g problem coincide with increases in the numbers of drug-
related editorials as well as political pronouncements 
regarding the drug war (such as the official declaration of 
the drc;g war, or a re-statement of the declaration during 
political campaigns). Conseqc;ently, the change in 
perception, or level of awareness, represented by the 
decrease in level of importance in more recent years may be 
the result of a highly publicized drug war (as long as 
people think the problem is being dealt with, it no longer 
holds top billing in their concerns). Another 
interpretation may be that the drug war has been placed on 
the back bc;rner of the public agenda, since no recent 
declarations have been made by the president, therefore the 
level of public awareness has declined. 
'"The data used to construct this figure was obtained from the Gallup Poll, various years, 
portions of which were obtained from the~, Volume 83,1995, p_22 
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2. Attitude 
Al though the a ttitude ind i cB:'o r car. be bro ke n d o wn into 
two components: ( 1) a t titudes :,o~lard drug use, and (2) 
att itudes towa rd drug-re l ated crime , it should not be 
f o r gott e n that it is linked to awareness. In general, 
then, i t can a l s o b e said that attitude~ are l inked to 
usage. Kids that don ' t think of drugs as harmful are more 
likely t o try the m. Attitudes, however, are diff i c ult t o 
i nterpret thug difficu l t t o measure. Any attempt t o measure 
this indicator wou l d most l ikely require a great deal o f 
su pposit i on . However, a descript ive analysis (uti l i zing 
dat.a on the level of arrests, the number of k ids reporting 
drug u se, what kids worry abo ut, and views toward drug 
se l l ing) cou ld prov e useful f or this indicato r . (see 
Figures 2 . 3, 2 . 4, 2. 5 and 2 . 6)@ 
Re garding the l evel o f arrests, as depicted in Figures 
2 . 14 and 2.15 under "reporti ng practice s," juveni l e arre sts 
saw an i ncrease from 198 3 t o 1985 and decreased slight l y f o r 
1 98 6 and 198 7 before peaki ng i n 1988 (after which, the 
p ercen t of juveni le drug arrests tapered down to less than 
five p ercent o f all juvenile arrests in 1991). The periods 
@Tbedatausedto generatethesefigureswasobtainedfromOOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, 
p. I (Figure 2.3), p.6 (Figure 2.5), and Reuter, p.xi (Figure 2.6) 
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of decrease appear to coincide with anti-drug declarations. 
Overall, the fairly consistent l evel of juvenile arrests 
suggests that the risks are being disregarded . 
Illicit Drug Use Trends 
(percentage reporting use) 
'::~ 
1982 1985 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 
• 12-17 !!il 18-25 o 26& up 
Figure 2.3 
The trends in this figure show a general decrease in 
useage (from 1982 to 1992) among eighteen to twenty-five 
year o1ds whic!l, as shown, is the highest use group . 
Although decreasing, the moderately high levels of useage 
among eighteen to twenty - tive year aIds suggests a 
complacent attitude toward the harmfulness of drugs. 
1982, the sec ond highest use group was the twelve to 
seven t een year o1ds --although their useage increased in 
1985, they were eclipsed by the twenty- six and up group. 
While use among the youngest group decreased from 1982 to 
1992, use among the oldest group increased up through 1993. 
The slight, yet steady, increase in use by the older group 
also suggests a lack of concern over the harmful effects of 
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drugs ( it a l s o ind i c ates t hat the use p o o l is getting older-
-thUs i n the later years o f the drug war, :!tore of the users 
spil l over into the olde.::" grouping). A sharp increase in 
use b y t we l ve to seven teen year a Ids occurred i n 1993 , ''''hi l e 
the i ncrease f o r ':.he lat ter two groups was only sl i ght . In 
partic u lar, eighth and tenth grade us e of marijuana , 
cocaine, LSD, and o,:her ha l luc inogens i n c !:'eased . 29 This 
upwar d trend i l lustra tes that despite the fact that ':he druc; 
wa r is stil l on, the message isn ' t getting OUt (th:'s would 
seem t o co inc ide '", i t h the decreas e in public awar e ness ). 
Another factor in the increased useage o f drugs is the 
"permissive attitude towa rd ma rijuana ," and the commonali ty 
of inhalant s . 30 'fhe permissiveness seaps t r.!:'ough via 
entertainment me dia, suc h a s movies and song l yri c s . 
Alt hough the a d ul ts , who were po lled as indicated in f i gure 
2 .2 , are less co ncerned about drugs in more recent years , 
youths--part icula!:'ly tho se in the t .. :elve to seve nteen 
g r ouping- - a r e worried . (see Figure 2.4) 
29DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, p 3 (see chart in Appendix B) 
30Srown, p_191 
2S 
KiDS WORRY ABOUT DRUGS 
Pera:ntage of&:loiescc:nts -aged 12 to 17 who say the 
must impurtMlI problem faL;ng peDple their <!lye is: 
Drugs 
="" 
Crime/viole",:>:: in smoGI 
><XXX>OOOOO<X 1 '" 
SGci<ll1 pressures 
I popularity J fitting in J 
)()OOOOOO{ 111 " 
Ooiogwell ill scnooi 
X1O<X '" 
Figure 2.4 
As Figure 2.4+* shows, kids are more worried about drugs 
than whether or !lot they are doing well in school. The 
higher percentage of kids in t he twelve to seventeen 
grouping that are worried about drugs is consistent with the 
increased use of drugs by this grouping that was noted in 
Figure 2.3. In contrast to the level of awareness of 
adults, depicted in Figure 2.2, the awareness of the pre-
teen and teen group is up because they are witnessing, or 
++lJ~ "Life," p_l. This chart is based on a chart appearing in thc16 Nov J995 
edition--the source for which was the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at 
Columbia University 
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being p ressured in to, th e use o f drlOgs mor e frequent ly t han 
in past y e ars. 32 
Drug Use by High School Seniors 
(percent reporting use) 
--.- Ever Past year --.- Past 30 days 
Th e d e c r ease s in eac h c a tegory, o f Fig'Jre 2.5, occur at the 
same time. The trend in the peaks al!d valleys suggests a 
linkage betwee n declarations o f war and decreases in drug 
use by high schoo l seniors (since these peaks coi:lcide with 
peaks in awar eness and occur in ~he general time frame of 
another d eclaratio n regarding the drug war--subsequent to 
J2 Another consideration. of course, is that the problems facing adults differ from those of 
children. Therefore their concerns, and the stress placed upon them, also differ 
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which useage declines). What th i s trend also suggests, via 
the sharp increase in drug useage in 1993, is that t he 
current administration (which .i£ continu ing the d r ug war) 
needs to make so:ne sort of formal declaration against drugs. 
A.dnl csttnls' Vie\¥1l of Drug Sclli"'l [p~rcerrtl 
Prisunscntcntt 
Sevcrc injury or death 
SeHer friends cam 
>S1001l/wk 
Studmls iclling at school 
I caln>SlOOO/Wt 
FlequenlOealelS OtherS8mple Mcmbcrs 
In ~ 351 In = 337] 
pcrcenlagcsecingou(comeas Vuyub:1yin 
a Yeal of Dru~ Dealin ~ 
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What the above chart suggests is that, al t hough adolescents 
recognized that drug sell ing was risky, frequent dea l ers 
perceived the risks as being lower and the monetary benefits 
as being higher than that perceived by the infrequent or 
nonseller. In other words, the risks did not dissuade the 
frequent dealer from c ontinuing the activity. Among these 
fifteen to seventeen year old inner city male respondents, 
only eleven percent used; whereas r sixteen percent sold 
28 
drugs . 33 !n t his instance , the n, sel l ing was not fo r the 
sake o f a cquiring th e funds t o support one' sown 'Jse, but 
merel y as an economic prospec:. . 
'i'wo a ddit iona. l f igure s (F igures 2 . 1 and 2.S) m':ghl also 
shed some ligh t on dru g use and t he attendar.l at t itudes. 
1993 National Household SUJ'\.'ey 
(percentage reporting use) 
l~li~ 




C 35 & up 
Figure 2.7 
The "ever" category sho wn in th i s 1993 survey is, as one 
wo u ld e x pect, tr.e highest in percentiles--the higt1est among 
wh ich is the t'..-enty -s i x to thirty-lour year old grouping. 
This i s con s i stent with the fa ct that as the drug war drO:les 
o n, the users a re g e t ting older. In the "past year" and 
"past month " categories, the highest percentile be longs to 
the eighteen to twenty - five year old groupi:lg . This is 
consiste:1t wi l h U·. o fact that in 19 93 more teenagers tried, 
"Reuter, p.x 
29 
and are a.ctively using, drugs (as seen in Figure 2.5 above). 
Although they are not in the highest percentile, it is 
disturbing to note tha t the twelve to seventeen year old 
grouping surpassed the thirty-five and up grouping in past 
year and past month useage (the percentage of this younger 
grouping is close behind the twenty-six to thirty- four 
grouping). This would seen to indicate that the message of 
"harm" is not reaching--or getting through to--the pre-teen 
and teen-age users. In fa ct, a university o f Michigan 
study f released in 1994 , ascertained that teen-age attitudes 
toward drug use have, indeed, eroded. 34 
Drug Use by High School Seniors 
(percent repo!til'lg use) 
Figure 2 8 
34S rown, p_191 . Given the old addage, "seeing is believing, H perhaps part of what is 
driving this increased use of marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines is the fact that "this new 
generation of young people did not witness the destruction these drugs caused in the 
past_" 
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T)::' 5 p ie chart shows -:h e pe r c entages {averaged over the 
~i f e o f t he c urr e nt dnlg war--f~om : '18 1 t o 1993} of higr. 
s c hoo l s enior dru g -.l se . Clearly, ':.he " ever" catego r y .l:ctS 
t.l:e highest pe r c e ntage , a nd it wil: always have ':.he h:'gher 
?e.:::-centage , because it covers a l o nge r span of time--
e nco::lpa ssing one --::'me use , cas u a':" use, and habitual u se . 
Al tho ugh the o ther ':.\'.'0 categori es could encompass all uses 
as we l l , they tend t o be nore indicative 0-: regl~lar Js e . 
» hown i n Figure 2 .5, however, until 1993 -::here has b ee n a 
gel'.eral dec l ine in all of these categorie s. 
3. Enforcement 
The enf o rcement indic ato~ consists o f tte polic i e s 
r egarding count.er-dru g opera t. i o ns and the cor-:::-espo:1d ing 
characteristics 0:: enforcement .. Z,gain, this indicator 
(part:'cular l y L'le charac':.e::-ist ic s aspe c t) is nore 
cescr':'pt i ve a nd i:1t e r pre-::ative in natu re and does no t 
r eadi l y lend itse lf t o measurement. Po l ic ~.es themselves d o 
not .:::-emai n CO:1s ,,:ant , mu c h less co nstan": i s t he ctaract e r o y 
whi c h t hey are enf o rc e d (dur ir.g an e l ectio n year, poL. t ical 
candi date s che c k ":.he p:l:"se o f the peop~e and play ~o their 
e xpress ed conce rns wh i c h ar e as f ickle as t;le views of the 
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As the chart depicts (via the negative relationship 
between user laws and serious drugs and the negative 
relationship between jai l terms and marijuana), the 
stringency of some drug laws , particularly those concerning 
marijuana, is mitigated by enforcement personnel. Depending 
on enforcement priorities regarding drug l aws (such as jail 
terms, fines or other penal ties), which differ from state to 
state, policy enforcement itself will vary (particularly 
when a disparity exists in the penalties for different by-
products of the same drug)36. Light punishments, for 
36Crack cocaine and powder cocaine have different enforcement requirements. For 
example, to get a five year sentence requires 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of powder 
(see "Comparing cocaine sentences" in Appendix B) 
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examp le, tend t o be as sociated wi th more arre sts; whereas, 
more severe penal t ies a re as s ociat ed wi t h f ewer a rres t s . In 
general, .. law e nforcement a genc i es [adapt 1 impl emen t ation 
po l icies t o condition s i n t he p o l i cy envi ro nment, " such as 
leve l o f d rug usage, urbaniza t i on , and ethni c ma ke_ up. 37 
,. Cooperation 
The o rga n i zat i on a s pect of t he organizatio n a nd 
cooperati o n indicat o r woul d entail a r evi ew of t h e 
responsibi lities a ssigned to e ach o f t he age nc i es i nvo l ved; 
wh e r eas , the cooperat ion aspect o f th i s i nd i c a tor me re l y 
requires a comp a rison bet ween sing l e a g ency mi ss io n s a nd 
joint agency miss i on s . As a r u le, t he mi l itary obj e ctive is 
t o s upport e f fort s t o inte r dict i ll egal drugs bef o re t hey 
reac h the United States. The f oca l po in t of c ivil ian agency 
objectives vary according to t heir areas of respons i b ility. 
For some, s uc h a s th e DEA, t he primary ob j ective is t o 
r e d uce supply; whereas, other agenc i es are more a ttentive to 
d emand reduction ( suc h a s l oca l and state law enforcement 
agencies arresting us e rs and t a king pushers off t h e st r eet 
i n a t tempt s to close open- air :narkets) . Numerous a g e ncies 
have a piece of the counter - drug pie (DEA f Customs, State 
37Meier, p.56. Meier's study also shows that states with higher percentages of black or 
hispanic residents have higher drug arrest rates. More black residents-->b.igher arrest 
rates for serious drug use and sales. More hispanics-->higher overall drug arrests, higher 
arrests for marijuana, sales or pos!'.ession of drugs 
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and local law enforcement agencies, and the Military to name 
a few). The budget for interdiction efforts alone is shared 
among eleven groups. (see Figures 2.10 and 2 11 )## 
National Drug Budget(lnterdiction) 
(rqu;lffilc:iim<iianj 
-= 
11m ~PlYk9.<: • lfI1d~ 
ED incIa1A1!airs rum T«Titaia/l-j:l'Il1B IIIIlI!I INS 
Figure 2.10 
As can be seen in the above figure, the DOD has had the 
biggest interdiction budget among this group of agencies. 
The first peak occurred in 1987 when the mi li tary became 
more involved in the drug war. After a drop in 1988, the 
budget began climbing again in 1989 and peaked out in 1992. 
The increasing amounts from 1989 t o 1991 are an expression 
of the Bush declaration of wa r on drugs (which, as mentioned 
##The data used to generate these figures was obtained ITom NDeS, pgs 235-238 
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earlier, c o i nc i de with the peaks in public concer n (l 98 9 and 
1990 ) indicated in Fi gure 2.2 ). Although its allotments 
a g enera l increa se from 19 87 to 1995, INS stil l holds a 
dista nt second pl a c e t o the DOD counter-drug budget. 
Howev e r , even given the i nc reases, and peaks, in the DOD 
budget its allotment was secon d t o the Coast Guard budget - -
uEti l 199 1, when the DOD won out. Increases in the 000 
budge t c oincide with t he increased responsibilities given t o 
it-- thr o u gh legislatio n (as ment i oned i :1 Chapter 1). 
N atlon .. 1 D ru g Budget (I nterdiction) 
(a1j .. ~' ~ d h, '~h"on) 
_ Co,,' G u~ rd I!l1i!'!J 
_ CU $ bma c:J 
A,,,ong the agencies charted in Figure 2.11, the Coast Guard 
receiv ed t he highest c ou nter - drug budget until 199 2 when it 
was finally surpassed by the a 2 lotment to customs. Customs, 
however, did not surpass tr.e DOD a l lotment until 1994 . T~e 
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decrease in Coast Guard and DOD money is the result of a 
focal shift- - from transit zone interdiction to source 
country interdiction . 
The overall counterdrug picture (interdiction, 
investigatio!ls, internat ional, prosecution, corrections, 
intelligence, state and local assistance, regulatory and 
compliance, other law enforcement, research and deve l opment, 
prevention, and t reatment) involves even more agencies . 
(see Figure 2.12)*# In 1996, the big winner, of course, is 
the DOJ which encompasses the FBI, DEA, INS, Interpol, U.S. 
Marshals service, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Forces, U.S. Attorneys, Bureau of Prisons, and other Justice 
programs. One would naturally assume that the DOD would 
have garnered the second highest counter-drug budget. 
Surprisingly enough, however, the next highest amount 
budgeted was for Health and Human Servi ces - followed by the 
Treasury, the VA, and then the DOD. 
*#Jbid. 
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Cnunh:Ninlg Pie {agency breakdownj 
OOJ 
Figute 2. 12 
Ther e are, perhaps, too many c hiefs and not enough 
i ndians. This, o f c o urse, leads to polit.ical in-fighting 
( bac k - stabbi ng and glo ry - grabbing ) which, needless t o say , 
is not condu c i v e t o s mooth operat ions. The organizat i o n of 
t hese differi n g agencie s is not always conducive t o inter -
agency cooperation . Breakdown in cooperat ion also occurs 
wh en these diverse a gencies pursue different object.ives. 
For example, t he CIA hindered DEA operations in Pana ma t o 
p r otect their investment in Noriega. When Noriega pro ved t o 
be no longer useful , and a ha ndful t.o deal with, t he CIA 
beccme mor e coop e rativ e (allowing the U.S. military "to 
i nvade Panama and capture Noriega so he could fac e cr iminal 
17 
charges in the U. s. ) . 40 Given these realities, one would 
susp ec t that every agency was pretendi ng to be the l one 
ranger; however, some cooperation does occur. (see Figures 
2. 1 3 and 2.14)+-* 
Representation of Cooperation 
(based on DEA seizures) 
04~1 __ IIiiii!l ~ """" I %::I
1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Year 
• % Cooperation 
Figure2.i3 
The peaks in cooperation (1985, 1989 and 199 1 ) appear 
to coi ncide with renewed declarations of the war on drugs 
and wi t h peaks i n public awareness of the drug probl em. 
4OLevine. pA5S 
+-The data used to generate Figure 2.13 was obtained from the 1994 Statistjcal AbstraC! 
of the I Inited Slates p .20? It is based on DEA seizures via interagency cooperation/ttl 
DEA seizures (in thousands of dollars) Figure 2. 14 was drawn from DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 
1994, p_l 
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Percent Counter-drug participation of agencies with primary drug 
e nfon:eRle nt responsibility: 
Type of agency 



















As Figure 2.1 4 shows, the tendency to cooperate is link ed to 
a g iven agency ' s ro le i n coun":.er-d:cug law enfo:;ccemen":.. If 
a n agenc y h ad prima ry responsibi lity, within its 
jurisdiction, for dru g law enforcement -:.hen its tendency to 
partic i pate in mUltiagency task forces was higher. 
5. Reporting Practices 
Report ing pract ices can be broken down in":.o four 
component parts: (1) number of juveniles a rrested for 
possession of ill egal drugs; (2) number o f j uveniles 
arr es ted for drug-related crime; (3) number of adults 
arrested for p ossessio n of i l legal drugs; and, ( 4) number of 
a dul ts a r r es ted for drug-related crime. In many cases, 
however, only t o tal numbers are given (wi t hout respect to 
the age of the a ccused) . Therefore, composite numbers are 
utilized for eval'Jation. Where the four separate sets of 
numbers are available, the best way to evaluate/measure the 
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results is by comparing t h e number of arrests for each group 
across the years--bearing in mind, however, as IT.entioned in 
Chapter I, that a change in focus affects the types and 
number of arrests made . (see Figures 2.15 and 2.16)@* 
Representation of Reporting Practices 
(based on drug alTestsitti arrests) 
% 0.10 - ~ ~ .-:l Iiiii1 • IIiii1 IIii'i O.15 '~ .J ~:~~ t .. l ' 
1981198219U1984100519~19871~1~1~19911~ 
Years 
• Drug Related Crime 
Figure 2.15 
Representation of Reporting Practices 
(based on Juvenile arrests) 





@*The data used to generate these figures was obtained from the S!aIist~ 
the [ To jled States and the WuddAlman.aJ;.. Figure 2 .15 is slightly modified from that 
utilized in Chapter I 
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Fo r t he mos t part, t:le trer:ds in Lle juvenile B::-r e sL patt e ::-r. 
m-=- :ui c that o f the adul::s depic:-ed 1n Figt;.re 2. 15 (peaking at 
r ough ly the same time ). This ",",o uld seem to indicate t.ia:. 
despi te the " Just Sa y No" nessa g e of the BOs, j uve ni l e drug 
u s e remained f ai rly c o ns::ant un t:l 1990. The c:ecreas e in 
juv e ni le dr ug use in ::he ear ly 90s cou:'d be Lle ::-esult o f 
e n h anced schoo :' training progra::ts weich s-:.emmed from t.ie 
establi s hrr.e n:: 0:: ne· ... · AIT.erican edl.:cation goals (as weI:' as 
r enewed coun":er -drl.:g declara::ions in 1989).43 
E. OBJECTI VES OF THE DRUG WAR 
Th e Depa rt:nent o f Edl.:cat':on has clearly de:'in e a ted its 
obj e ct :'ves f or saIer ar:d better educatio:l, bl.:t have c:he 
objectives f o r tf:e co unter-drug war been as clear? The 
Nat ion~l Drug Co r:trol St r ategy Budgec: (wiidl is subject ::0 
approval, a nd c uts , by Co ngress ) is c:he president's way of 
maki ng hi s cou:lter - dru g st:::-at e gy :<;:nown (via budget requests 
f or certain a c tivities ) . (see Figures 2. 17 and 2. 18 ) ,# 
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Figure 2 . 18 
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':'h e Carter adlni n ':stratio n e nded before the cc:rrer:t war on 
drugs was institut.cd , the .::efo re the key adrninistra~':ons 
invo l ved in th i s Via::: a r e t he Re agar::, Bc:sh, ar:d Clintor:: 
c1dministrat ions. 'rh e budget :::equests, depicted it:. the above 
f igu res, wi l l be us ed as a guid e in de:.ermining each 
admi n istr a t ion 's cOl: nter - narcot ics objectives. 3earing in 
mi nd t hat, although there a re o t her areas, "::he fou::: ma j o r 
fu nc t iona: areas [ in drug contro : sper:ding inc:ude: 1 (1 ) 
demand reducti on , (2) domestic law en:::orcement, ( 3 ) 
inte r nat i o nal , and (4 ) interdi c tion e:::forts. ,,45 Functio nal 
area two essentially folds into demand side efforts (a l o ng 
with p :::even t i o n and treatmer:t e f forts), and areas three and 
f ou r a re supply side programs. 
1. General Trend s 
On the whole, inte rdi c t ion increased through 1991--
e xpe r iencing a sl ight dip in 19 86 and a more not i c e ab l e d ip 
i n : 9 88. In <:.h e 1992 t o 1995 b udgets, in terd ictio n saw a 
d ecrea se whi le c o rrections and investigations i ncreased. I r. 
general, prosecuti on and intelligence dollars inc:::eased over 
t h e life of the d r ug wa rj international dollars s aw a 
general increas e u ntil 1993 where it dipped and decreased 
thr o ugh 19 95 (wit h sl i g ht dips occurring in 1983 and 1988) . 
45NDC S, po l O 
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Corrections saw a steady increase until reaching an initial 
peak in 1990, after the dip in 1991 the amounts again 
increased until its p i nnac le was reached in the 1995 budget. 
Overall, the allotment to treatment increased over the years 
of the war as did monies to prevention and research; state 
and local law enforcement dollars saw a general increase 
over the years although i t did experience a d ip in 1988 and 
another in 19 92; regulatory and compliance dollars were· kept 
at fairly low levels throughout the war although it did see 
an increase in the 90's. The amount allotted to other law 
enforcement increased until 1993, where it reached its peak 
before decreas i ng over the last two years. 
2. Presidential Obj ectives 
The most stressed aspects in the Reagan administration 
(January 1981 to January 1989 ) were interdiction and 
treatment which were followed fairly closely by 
investigations and corrections- -indicating that although the 
main emphasis fell on interdiction from the last year of the 
first term and throughout the second term, the primary 
objective called for both demand and supply reduction. In 
1989, when the Bush administration came into office, the 
primary focus was again interdiction which was followed most 
closely by treatment, investigations, and corrections. In 
1990, corrections surpassed interdiction, and treatment, 
indicating stricter laws in support of the nation's demand-
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side e ff or t. s whi le ma intaining effo rts toward supply 
reduction (meaning that t he increased numbers of people- -
both suppliers and u s ers-- i n car c erated in 198 9, required 
more funds to pro vide f o r t h em ) . In 199 1, in t e r diction 
again won out - -hitt ing its hig hest point- - and the money f o r 
corre c tions d r opped s ignificantly, indicating that the 
emphasis was once again o n supp l y. After its p e ak in 19 91, 
the a llotment f o r interdic-:.ion has been on the decline; 
meanwhile, the allo tment for correct i o ns has increased 
i nd i cating a s hift in focus back to the demand side . In 
1992 , wh en t h e Clinton administration came into office, 
corre c tio ns had increa sed to on c e a gain surpass 
investigat ions bu t still f el l below inte rdiction. 
Interdict i o n mone y was, however, surpassed by the allotment 
t.o treatment (and t he b u dget f o r prevention was still more 
than t he a llotment f o r corrections) indicating a demand- s ide 
emp has i s held in con c ert wit h a cont inued attack on t he 
s upp ly-s i de . From 1993 to 1995, treatment he l d the t op 
spot , f o llowed by correc tions , and interdic t ion do llars 
during t his period fell below prevention. Although supply-
side efforts were being maintained, the stress in the latte r 
years of the drug war has heen on tr,(\ demand - s ide. 
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THE PUBLIC' 5 ROLE 
What is t he role of the public in determining the terms 
and measures of success or fa i lure in the war on drugs? As 
mentioned in Chapter I, the public impacts po l icy-making 
through a number of ways, such as: (1) complaints to local 
and state agencies; (2) editorials; and, (3) political 
acj~ion comu:ittees. Policymakers consider where public 
concern meets with their political objectives and the 
nat ional interes ts, then they draw up the terms/objectives 
wh i c~ offers a best-fit solution. However, where 
me ..... surement of program effectiveness is concerned, it 
appears to have been a self-evaluative process. 
One of the problems with self measurement, is the 
skewing of data to support a given party' s views 
(politicization). The following quote serves as an example 
of t he political rhetoric which has plagued the drug war. 
Drug use declined ~teadily and dramatically prior to the Clinton 
Administration, which undennined anti-drug efforts on ail fronts46 
46Walters, J.P. "Tonight Only: ABC Does Drugs" This article rt':garding "America's W:u-
on Drugs: Searching for Solutions," [an ABC News special) , was entered into the House 
record by Han. Gerald BJ-I. Solomon of New York ,on April 6, 1995, to support his 
views on the drug war 
47Soiomon, Gerald "Redeclare the Drug War." A statement made by the Honorable Mr. 
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In ar!other statement before the House, Mr . Solomon makes 
r eferenc e to permissive drug policy in the Carter 
Admini stratio n . Des p i te what the Hor-orab l e Mr. So l o man 
says, t h e nat iona l d rug c o ntro l budget !',as, fo~ the mos t 
part , increased o ver the years of the drug war--regar d l e ss 
o f who ( d emocra t or republican) was in the office of 
p resident . (s ee Figure 2.1 9)++ Essentia l ly, as illustrated 
a b ove , th e signigicant change occurs i n t h e focus of 
coun ter-d r ug ef f o r ts, no t in the budget. (see Figure 2.20) 
Solomon, in the House of Representatives, on January 4, 1995 
++rhe data used to generate Figures 2.19 and 2.20 was obtained from NDCS, pgs 235-
238. Inflationary adjustments were made using the GDP deflators found in the 1995 
International Financial Statjstics Yearbook p.781 Since deflators were not availablefor 
1995 and 1996, they were estimated 
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National Drug Control Budget (FY81-95) 
(Wlmllh:ms) 
Tobli Drug Budg~tln Stable Don:ns 
r.glD..,".19 
Even after adjusting for i nf l ation, the above pie chart 
clearly indicates that the counter~drug budget ha s inc:::-eased 
each year. As the projected budget for 1 996 indicates, the 
total amount obligated to the d rug war has not changed 
significantly (despite Mr . Solomon·s beliefs, t he war has 
not been visibly weakened) . 
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1996 Federal Drug Control Budget 
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Figure 2_20 
The pie chart In FIgure 2.20 shows that the focus for 1996 
will be on (l) t::-edt:ne~t, ( 2 ) correctio ns, (3) prevention, 
and ( 4) invest i gations. Overal':', this budget request 
repres e nts a push toward conmun i t y Involvement; more 
re s e arch and ana':'ysisi ar.d "a more ba':'anced, long-term, and 
':ntegrat ed app::-oach ~hat st:::-esses efforts in the source 
cou~t:ri es. ,, 49 In o:.he:- words, the st::-ategy calls for derr.and 
(th i rty -six pe::-cent) ar.d supply (six-:.y-four percen-:.) 
redc.ctio n activities while enabling a greater flexlbi l i t y in 
how cOlHnlulllt..ies manage federal dr:.lg (:ont_roJ alluc(l.tions. 50 
4~UCS. p_') 
5l'Nncs, p_15 "Of the total $14.6 hillion request forFY 1996, $9_3 billion is for supply 
reduction programs and $5.3 hillion is for demand reduction programs" 
G. ARE 1fE WINNING? 
Based on the data, and the criteria within this 
chapter, the counter-drug war has proven to be successful i n 
some short battles - -within the military, for example, due to 
zero tolerance policies and random urinalysis, the counter-
drug campaign is fairly successful--but unsuccessful as a 
whole (meaning that, in the grand scherr.e of things, counter-
narcotics activities have not achieved the overriding, 
desired, objective--to win the war on drugs). If only some 
of the objectives are met, t hen only the short game may be 
won--not the longer , or end, game. (see Figures 2.21, 2.22, 
and 2.23)'"·· 
·'·lnformation for these figures was obtained from DOJ Fact Sheet, Feb 1994, p,4. The 
1993 figures for Cocaine, Heroin, and Marijuana (found in Figure 2.21) were obtainltd 
ITom the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAl\fHSA), "1993 
Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network," Advanced Report 
Number 8, Dec 1994 
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Figure 2.21 
As the above figure shows, cocaine use increased from 1988 
t o 1989, then took a dip in :'990 before once again 
inc reasing . After a decrease in 1990, hero in also resumed 
an increasing trend. Marijuana mentions, whi le i ncreasing 
during the same time period as heroin, did not surpass 
h e r oin until the last year of the survey. 1988 thro:..lgh 1991 
saw an overall decreasing trend in methamphetamine and PCP 
mention s. Al though increases and decreases were noted, both 
LSD and methadone mentions remained at moderately low levels 
throughout. Drug abuse episodes rose from 1988 to 1989, and 
took a dip in 1 990 before once again increasing. The first 
peak in 1989 , and the subsequent decrease in 1990, is 
51 
consistent with increased awareness, public outcry, and a 
renewed declaration of war on drugs. The increases from 
1990 to 1993, matched with those of drug mentions, indicate 
a general disregard for the effects and risks associated 
with drug use. 52 
Past Year Drug Use by 8th Graders 
· :~WI~A1~,-.1L 
Manjua Irlhalarlt LSD Other HCocaine Crack Other Heroin StimulaSteroids 
• 1991 R 1992 = 1993 
Figure 2.22 
The primary drug of choice among eigth graders, shown Figure 
2.22, is inhalant--followed most closely by marijuana. Over 
the period of this survey, there were increases in the use 
of all but two drug types (other hallucinogens and steroids 
which peaked in 1992 before decreasing in 1993). 
52See Table 15 of Appendix B for the actual numbers and for plots on total drug mentions 
(Figure B.I) and total drug abuse episodes (Figure B.2) 
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Past Year Drug Use by 10th Graders 
• 1991 • 1992 n 1993 
figure 223 
For tenth graders , shown in Figure 2.23, the drug of 
c h o i ce is marijuana . After a decrease ir. 1992, marijuana 
peaked o ut in 1993. 1992 also saw a decrease in the use of 
coca ine a nd other hall-.lcinogens. The other drugs used by 
tenth g raders (stimulants , inhalants, LSD, o t her cocaine, 
c rack, and heroin) increased over the period of the s urvey . 
Although e ve!:! the highest percentage for both of these 
gro u p s ( 19 . 2) remains b elow t,,'enty percent , it is not 
c omfort i ng (especially since the tre:lds are increasing). 
Part o f the prob l em that exists with inhalants is that they 
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are commonplace - -every household has products which could be 
used as an inhalant. The wide - spread availabili ty of these 
products suggests a lack of harmfulness. 53 
It seems that constant declarations are needed to spur 
agency actions and gain public awareness (which impact 
attitudes on use, the number of arrests made, and the level 
of agency cooperation). 
53Brown, p_192. Dr, Johnston was involved in the University of Michigan 1993 
"Monitoring the Future Study." The study noted the increase in youth drug use from 1991 
through 1993 This study also noted a decline in anti-drug attitudes. 
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III. WHY THE U. S . IS LOSING THE DRUG WAR 
Why is t he United St..ates lasing the drug war? What 
r o l e d o e conomic i nd i cators p lay in the decision t o deal in 
i l legal narcoti c s ? th'hat is the c o st to A:!lerican counter -
d rug a genc i es? These q uestions, as well as some others, 
wil l be c onsidered . 
In additio n -::'0 th e e conomi c s o f the drug war, t.his 
c h apt e r wi l l di scuss na r co-terror isrr, a :1d motivat i o ns for 
c artel and counter-drug agency armame:1t, the militari zatio n 
of th e d r ug war as a wh o le a nd the impac t of the d rug 
cartel ' s a r mamen t on Amer i c an society and 0:1 t.he United 
St a t es' abi l i ty t o coun te r the drug trade . To bette r a n swer 
t h e questio n o f "why th e U. S. is l o s ing the drug war I" t he 
a fo r eme ntioned aspe cts should be considered first. After 
a l l , t hey he l p paint the pic tu re of where we stand in this 
A . ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
1 . For The Drug Trafficker 
The e conomi c perspec t ive for the drug t raff i cker 
invo lves both drug profits and a rms purchases/transfers. 
The p rimary reason drug trafficking has not been eradicated 
Is the fact that it is a very lucratlve business. The 
e conomi c indicato rs that illegal drug dealers are mos t 
interested in inc l ude the risk- reward ratio, and return on 
5S 
investment (the chance to overcome poverty is particularly 
appealing to low income entrants into the market). 
Traffickers know that they may be caught and imprisoned, but 
in weighing the cost (possibl e jail time) against the 
benefit (lots of money) they generally elect to go for the 
money. (see Figure 3.1 below) It is the high rate of 
ret urn which, in fact, compensates for the risks which 
accompany the drug trade. (see Figure 3.2 below) 
Selling Frequency and Earnings 
Frequency of sales % Monthly Gross Income Median (S) Monthly Net Income Median ($) 
Daily (mean) 37 
2+ days/wk 40 









As Figure 3.1 shows, frequent sellers made relatively large 
incomes--Iarger than could have been expected from 
legitimate activities . 


















@Rcuter, Economics arCOme p.lx Members of the Rand corporation have done 
extensive ~'tUdies regarding the economics of crime 
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The chart, in Figure 3 . 2 , represents the amount of 
c o mpensat ion (built in t o the high earnings) tha~ a dealer 
mi ght e x pect given th e risks of injury, imf)risonme:1t, o r 
deat h , "The v a lu e [ o f l ife and freedom ] depends on life time 
earn i ng potential a nd attitudes t oward risk . • 56 Drug 
t raff icking g r osses "a pprox imately $120 billion annually ."S7 
For t h e d i rt poor farmers of Latin America, Asia, and the 
Midd l e Eas t , who ba r e ly manage to scrape up enough for 
subsis t e n ce, c ultivation o f illegal drugs p=omises at least 
t r i pl e the inc ome of leg a l c :co ps . consequent l y, for these 
ind i viduals, the e c onomic choice is obvious . 
As shown in Fi gu re 3.3, the profitability of these 
illegal c r o ps increases at e ach 5JOi:1t along the production 
c hai n ( f rom c rop cultiva t i on t o processing to distributio n). 
Production Chain 
\ ' \ Coca Plant ~ Coca Paste Q\ Initial Cocaine Powder I) pstredet 
I _ ower 
($20-$30) ($160-$200) ($10,000) ($250,000) 
#Ibid., P 104 




After initial processing, "members of powerful drug cartels 
purchase the product for about $160 to $200 a k ilo. ,,58 The 
next link prior to shipping to t he distributor, final 
processing, increases the value by at least tenfold . The 
finished product is then smuggled into the United States 
where local distributors adulterate the product either with 
powdered milk or a like substance to stretch it out (thereby 
increasing the profit margin). "A k ilo of cocaine from 
Colombia that is first sold in the U.S. for $10,000 will 
eventually gross more than $250,000 on the street. ,,59 
Marijuana initially sold in the U.S . at $5,000 a pound, 
retailing at $450 an ounce, will net over $2 million on the 
street. (Refer to Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix C) These 
illegal drug businesses are operated in the same manner as 
legal businesses which is what makes them so profitable. 
with normal businesses, the drug trafficker assesses the 
"market and looks for ways to increase [that market] · and 
their profits at the same time . ,, 60 Part of the monetary 
profit is re-invested in the business (of producing drugs), 
part goes toward protection (such as armament or bribes), 
part is invested outside the business in areas that 
eventually benefit it (ie . in legitimate businesses which 
58Ibid 
59Ibid " p. 13 
60Ibid 
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ena ble the laundering o f drug mo ney) as \o,'ell as the drug 
p r odu c ing terri tory ( by making services avai l able tha t 
improve q u a lity of life); a nd , of course, the remaining 
port i o n g oes to the ca r t el leader s hip . 
What prompts d r ug cartel s and t.heir t rafficking agents 
t o arm t.hemselve s ? How have arms sales to d.rug cartels (and 
t h e corresponding p erpetuat ion of narco-terrorism) affected 
society? And , how has this armament impact.ed counter-
nar cot ics e fforts ? There are several schools of thought 
governi ng motivat ions for a cqu iring arms. :n order t o 
answer the carte l armament quest ion, it might be usefu l to 
review s ome of the e xis ting opinions on motivational 
f a ctors . 
Motiva t i ons For Arms Purchase 
What compe l s orga nizations (legal or otherwise) to 
arm themselves ? Acco r d ing t o Joel Johnson, motivationa l 
f actor s include: (1) regi onal, ethnic, and socia l strife; 
(2 ) rep lacements for old equipment and old technology; and 
( 3) a l ly support whi c h is typically initiated by t he donor 
count ry in order to gai n influence over the recipi ent , to 
he lp a f r i endly c o untry to dissuade neighboring countries 
from adventurism, or to enable an al l y to fight. along wit.h, 
or in lieu of, the donor country 's mili tary.61 
61Johnson, 1., p. 111-1 16 
59 
Keith Krause's theory of motivations for acquiring 
indicates that the driving factors are: ( 1 ) internal--
securing the regime against internal threats or using 
military development as a vehicle for social and economic 
modernizat ion ; (2) regional--guaranteeing security, fighting 
wars and acquiring regiona l influence or hegemony; and, (3) 
systemic--the pursuit of status, power and prestige. 62 
In their article, Mark Suchman and Dana Eyre show 
that motivations vary across several theories . These 
theories are: (1) strategic-functional, (2) factional, (3) 
geo-political, and (4) institutional . 6-1 strategic-
functional motivation is based on security needs (internal 
and external concerns) ; factional motivation is the resul t 
of internal political interests; geopolitical motivation is 
based on systemic and regional conflicts; and institutional 
motivations for acquiring arms are driven by modernization 
and sovereignty issues. 
Why do Cartel's and counter-drug agencies arm 
themselves? Is the corresponding arms proliferation 
productive or necessary? Is it too late, or even possible, 
to counter the drug war's arms proliferation? Given a basic 
idea of motivational factors, as discussed above, the 




a tte mpt wil l b e made to answer the questions regarding 
prolifera tio n , a complete intel lec tual debate is beyo nd the 
scope o f t his t hesi s . 
At the he art o f law enfo r c ement ' s difficulty in 
countering the narcot i c s problem is the we l l organized 
i n f ras tructure o f il legal drug b:lsinesses . This industry, 
however, d e als in more than just drugs. As t:,e followi ng 
di s cussio ns on c artel armament and narco-terrorism will 
show, a rms , d rugs and terrorism have melded toget.her to 
c r eate a new threat t o global security . 
b. ArmllDleDt By Cart els 
Cl early , arms transfeys no l onger merely co ncerns 
the a cquisit ion and maintenance of national security by 
natio n- s t a t es . Non- state a ctors, such as terrorist 
o r g an i zations and d:::-ug cartels are also a:::-ming thems e lves. 
In light o f the aforementioned motivations, it wou l d a p pear 
that drug carte l s fit s e veral categories . Cartels a rm 
t hemse l ves f o r the sake of security--in defense of the drug 
trade · ; they hope to exert influence over ot.hers 
( i n t ernal ly , upon their own growers and traffi c kers , and 
e x tern a l ly , up o n potent i a l competi tion and political 
officers); and, they tend to have a global impact (for the 
s c ourge whi c h they perpetuate i mpacts source, transit., and 
-Konrad, p.57 "Resources iare used] to establish and enforce property rights" 
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destination countries). Therefore , cartels encompass 
Johnson' s strife and ally indicators, Krause' s interna l 
indicator, and some aspect of each of Suchman and Eyre' s 
theoretica l models. Apart from the impact of weapons in a 
given battle, the presence of weapons offer the bearer 
strategic deterrence capabi lity, prestige, and political 
power. Among the indicators within these three articles; 
however, there is at least one thread of comparison that 
shines through as most applicable to the cartel~-security. 
As with all things - -be it man, animal, or organizations--
security is a basic need which serves as a foundation upon 
which life is built. Take away the foundation, and the 
structure will crumble. The primary reaso n for cartel 
armament, then, is that cartels seek to maintain their 
infrastructure by ensuring security withi n the operating 
environment. 
Other militant groups- - those who oppose cornmunism- -
who are mired in ethnic conflict, or consumed by simple 
greed, also acquire their anns through illegal drug sales. 
Not to be overlooked, are countri es in South East Asia which 
is rife with ethnic and social conflict. In Cambodia, for 
example, the surplus weapons from a war-time build up have 
found their way into the hands of drug traffickers . 65 
65Lintner. p _5 
62 
Vi etnam (aided by the collusion between political and 
cr i mi nal e lements wi thin Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, 
Laos, North Korea, a nd Thailand) plays a significant role as 
a t ransit country f or ill egal arms and drugs. 66 (see map 1 
o f Appendix C) VietnaD's illegal arms clientele inc l ude: 
Philipp i ne oppositio:1 groups, Burmese rebel groups, Sri 
Lank en Tamil Tigers , ar::d Ir::dia' s Naga rebels. 67 Condoned 
via agreemen t with the military goveEur:ent, rebe:' Burmese 
armies o penly use their arms in defense of the narcotics 
tra d e. 68 I n fa ct, these ethni c armies not or::ly protect drug 
labs , they sometimes participate in the processing of 
heroin. Drugs su c h a s heroin, wh ich is rampant wi thin South 
East Asia, are smuggled throughout the world by Chinese, 
Nigerian , and Japanese gangs who take advantage of the 
strife striken nations to feed their greed. These crimina l 
gangs ar e generally ruthless and well armed. 
c. Marco-terrori sm 
In t Oday's wor l d, the threat of communism is 
replaced by yet another threat . This threat is Narco-
t err orism and its main proponents are drug cartels. The 
inter-depe nden c y of drugs and terrorism has increased to an 
unpredictable level. Often with the protection of a state 




apparatus, the drug cartels are free to pursue their 
livelihood of drug trafficking. Profits from this illegal 
business serve to fund their militant counterparts. 
Sometimes drugs are directly swapped for arms, but often it 
is the money from the illegal drug industry that purchases 
the arms for drug cartels, their militant factions, and t h e 
military and government officials who assist them in their 
endeavors. A prime example of this sort of arms transfer is 
the Bolivian Secret Service which supplied weapons to 
terrorists in exchange for narcotics which it then sold in 
U. s. and European markets. 69 
Narco - terrorism is evil and, unfortunately, its 
reach is global. But, what is Narco-terrorism and what is 
its goal? "Narco-terrorism is the use of drug trafficking 
to advance the objectives of certain governments and 
terrorist organizations. ,,70 The goal of this activity is 
"to weaken the moral fiber of the target society by 
encouraging widespread addiction, and by nurturing the 
SOCially enervating criminal activities that flourish around 
the drug trade." 71 
69Ehrenfeld, p.S 
7oJbid .• p_xii 
71fbid_, pxviii 
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Marxis t based g ov ernments around t he worl d u s e the 
traff i c ki ng of i l legal nar cotics to finan c e a nd furth e r 
t hei r t.er:::-o:::-i s':. ac':. ivi':.ie s ( a p r ime examp l e b e i ng :.he Ca stro 
regime and .:ts use o f il lega l drug s a les "to f a c i l i t a te its 
campa i gn Il gll ':ns-:. Bat':sta i n its bid for powe r and t o f u r ther 
i t s capab i lity t o e xpor-:. r e volu-:.ior: in Latin Anerica and 
beyond). 72 
Ac c o r d i ng t o Rachel Ehrenfeld, narco--:'er::-o r is-:. 
orga n izations are steep ed in Mar x ist-Len':nist i deo l ogy and 
ma y eve n receiv e the i r training from states wh i ch a r e 
al igned w': th comrm:nism ( i f no-:. d':rect l y from Russia).73 
Accordi ng ~y , i-:. i s l ike l y that :Jonald Ma~ry' s assessrrcen:. o f 
d r ug trafficking a n d g u e r::-illa organiza-:.ions is ql:.i':.e 
accl:. r ate. Narco-ter ror ist o r gan i zations use "capitalis-:' 
mea n s a nd app e t i te s t o des-:. r oy cap':ta:ism. ,,74- In view of 
t h i s, nar co-terr o r ':sm's prirrary target i s the Un.:ted Sta t es 
s i nce it i s tt:.e _eading capita~ist country. 
COl:.ntries such as 301':via, Bulga::-':'a, Colorrbi a, 
Cuba, Lebanon , and Perl:, among others, ma':'nta i n connections 
wi t h Ma rxist f actions, and other non-democrat i c 
organ i zat ions; -:'hey co ntr ibute to the development of narC Q-





terrorism to western countries--particularly the United 
States. The drug trade, then, is part of the economic 
process through which arms are acquired by governments 
around the world. The arms received vary from small arms 
(ie. rifles) to SAMs, artillery guns, mortars and rockets. iS 
In fact, the PLO's illegal drug profits have enabled it to 
acquire more advanced arms. 76 
In the past, the association between narcotics 
sales and arms transfers has been, for the most part, 
ignored. Perhaps because the very idea is too shocking to 
comprehend--especially by the people in America's heartland-
-or, perhaps, because there were political strings which 
were too delicate to bear the stress of a firm stance on t h e 
issue (such as the United States' ties with Syria, in 
support of action against Iraq, during the Gulf War). The 
link between illegal drugs and armament can no longer be 
denied, and the motivations behind it must be understood in 
order to establish viab l e practices for countering it 





Al tho ugh the following statement was made by 
Genera l Duan xiwen in 1967, its words still ring true for 
many of t oday' S third world freedom fighters who find 
themselves drowning in a sea of ethnic and polit':'cal strife. 
Obviou s l y, il l egal drug trade is a symptom of the much 
deep er problems within supplying countries. This real ity 
mak es f i ghting the drug war al l the more difficu l t. Rath e r 
t ha n att empt a solution to the inner s ickness, t he Bush 
admin istration (and o t hers) continued to focus on the by-
p r oduct (drug-trafficking) and enhance the armamer,t of 
c ounter - narcotics agencies. This strategy did more than 
ignor e t h e inhere:lt proble ms of suppl':'er count r ies, it also 
w ignored the complex socia l and economic roots of the 
demand+ for drugs within the united States .• 79 
2. For The War Against Drugs 
The ec onomic perspective for the war aga i nst drugs also 
involv es arms purchases and transfers (mainly in s upport o f 
77Ibid_. p_ ll 
+Gergen, p.S4 "The United States accounts for 5 percent of the world's population and 
consumes 50 percent of the world's cocaine " 
79J-Ianung, p 136 
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supply side interdiction efforts). This section will 
address economic issues regarding both the efforts of the 
demand side and the supply side of the drug war. 
The very profitability of the illegal narcotics 
business is what makes combatting it so difficu lt. "Despite 
the more than $26 billion the Reagan and Bush 
administrations have d evoted to enforcing anti - drug la\OlS 
[and the more than $4 billion devoted by the Clinton 
administration], drug trafficking continues to plague the 
United States. "80 In fact, drug traffickers have more than 
ten times the government· s anti - drug budget available to 
them, collectively, to utilize either in finding new routes, 
re-packaging the product or taking other measures to ensure 
that they get their product to market (such as the use of 
semi-submersib les as seen in Figure 1 of Appendix C). 81 As 
can be seen by the tables, (see Tables 3 through 5 of 
Appendix C) production efforts have not been eliminated (in 
fact, there appears to have been a general increase despite 
concerted efforts to preclude it). 
8OSwisher, p 13 
RIKonrarl , p_65. Ifa disparity exists in regional drug policies, canels merely shift thei r 
base of operations to a more amenahle location--similarly, if addicts cannot get what they 
want from one region, they may migrate to a region which enables their activity. To 
counter this would require policy coordination and migration restrictions, but the fanner 
"may involve high transaction costs of finding an enforceable agreement," and the latter 
would "impose a burden on those (including addicts) who want to migrate for reasons 
other than evading drug law enforcement" 
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a . Armament By Ame ric a 
Drug c artel s and mi l itan-:. factions are not the 
o nly o ne s a rming themselves. Whe t her the stakes warrant it 
or not, America has armed i-:.s l aw enforcement a ge ncies in 
s upport of its count e rdrug p rogram--perhaps in ef fort t o 
lend more t eet h t o an1:i - narcotics policies; but, defini tel y 
militari z ing t his pse:ldo · .... ar. Narcotics enterprises, whi c h 
h a v e d e ve l o p e d thanks to il l icit drug profits, "have helped 
c r i minal a uthority g row at the expense of legitimate sta t e 
authority .• 82 The motivations , then , behind America' s 
armament o f counter - drug agenc i es is for securi':.y against 
the u nde rmini ng inf luence of drugs within America 
(externa lly driven internal confl i ct) and to maintain its 
in f luential t ies with o ther countries which are also 
fighting th i s s c o urge. Since economic revitalizat i on is 
a lso important t o Amer ican po licy-makers, its export of arms 
is al s o tied to the eco nomic security of indus t ry. 
Consequent l y, the United States has provided arms to Andean 
countries ( Bol ivia, Colombia, etc.) to back their efforts 
agai nst narcot ics ( l ink to security and a l ly support 
moc i v a tion indicators) . ( See Figures 3.4 and 3.5)83 
82Lee, p.209 
8JSee also Figures 2 and 3 of Appendix C 
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FY84 FY85 FY86 FY8; FY~~ FY89 
Figure 3.4 
FY91 FY92 F)'93 
11,618 20,378 17,9111 12,5RO 
24 7,177 29,995 34,098 29,757 
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Foreign Military Construction Sales Deliveries (lOOOS) 






1.919 1,750 1,957 1.44 1 
3J6 2.065 2,024 
In August of 1989, Bush approved the shipment of 
$65 mi llion in military aid to the government of Colombia 
for use in its c ounter-drug war. S6 The armament of the 
Andea n nations, as shown in the charts, by far exceeded 
federal assistance to the states and localities ~lithin the 
United States. Included in the arms supply were: twenty 
Huey helicoptersi one blackhawk med-evac helo; small 
aircraft (such as the A37 fighter jet) ; assault boats; and a 
~FMS, p. 20-23 
u Ibid., p. 26-27 
86Hartung, p.135 
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vari e ty o f firepower. 87 Al though c.he intent behind the 
as sist t o t he Andean c o untries was to reduce t he over-
d epende nce (economicall y ) o n the drug trade, the result wa s 
a n i ncrea se in human r i g hts violations . The tact i cs 
u t i l i 2e d by arme d And e an f orces smacked of "Vietnam era 
pacifica t io n tact ics" wherein the peasantry were saved ( fro m 
carte ls and guerillas ) by being destroye d . 88 Tho 'Jgh it has 
b ee n rep orted by the Cl inton adminis t ration that there wi l l 
be less emphasis p l aced on rd l itary and law enfor cement 
a pproaches t o the drug problem and more emphasis placed on 
demand r e duc':.io n , "t he U. S . continues to give ample arms aid 
t o Bol i v i a , Co lombia, EC 'Jador, Guatemala, and numerous other 
c lient states in the name of fighting drug trafficking. ,,89 
Since in many countries narcotics trafficking ar.d 
gueril la f act ions are inextricably linked, narco-terrorism 
is fas tly bec ordng a t op priority issue. In the U.S . , 
however, t he f o c us rema i ns prima r ily on the drug t rafficking 
c ompo nent o f t he probl em . Amer i can J o int Task Forces 
provide intelligence f or in-sta t e ass i stance ':.0 the Drug 
Enforcement Agency as well as mobile radar deploYllients along 
ou r natio n 's borde r to det ec t and monitor drug smuggling 
activities . As mentioned in chapter one , the mi litary also 
87Ibid p_lJ6 
~8lbid p.l3? 
89Ibid., p. 139 
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pr-ovides sea and air- monitoring as part of its continued 
participation in Amer-ica ' s counter--drug efforts , In fact, 
the U, S, Navy recently acquired a new drug smuggler- radar to 
assist in these effor-ts in the vicinty of i'uerto Rico. This 
$10 mil l ion radar system known as Relocatable Over- The 
Horizon Radar (ROTHR) is designed to detect drug smugglers' 
vessels or- p l anes as they attempt to transport illegal drugs 
into Puer-to Rico,gO I nfor-mation technology is u t ilized to 
tr-ack cartel money- laundering processes (insofar as it 
assists in determining where t he money is, how much is 
there , where it is going, and to whom or what it is to be 
credited) , 
The non-defense military industry sector is using 
the drug war to preserve their- economic base in a post - cold 
war society , The weaponry which this industry convinced our-
government to sale i s not effective for non-convent i onal 
counter - drug teams need conununications and 
surveillance equipment to track down drug traffickers, not 
conventional warfare weapons , The suppl y of such weapons 
merely adds to the problems of the drug war, Their-
availabili t y in supply countries elevates the opport unit ies 
for armament of the very or-ganizations which are export ing 
drugs and te r rorism, 
9OLeavin, p.3A. 
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The b est .... 'ay to sto p drug trafficking invo lves 
denying the tra ffi ckers an infrastructure within wh ich t o 
ope r ate. As with the child 's game, "King of t he Mountai n ,· 
if the King can' t be toppl ed by brute force, the n h i s fee t 
h ave t o b e Icnoclc ed out f r om under him (by cut t ing away at 
h is f ou ndation ). Th e feet, or f ou ndat ion, in this i nsta nce 
is t h e dru g trafficke r ' s infrastructure and his market. I f 
t he market is diso l v ed , th e Kingpin falls (ie. by cutt i ng 
d emand ). This ca n be a ccomp lished I"lithout further 
prol iferation o f arms among nationa l and international 
count e r-drug o rgani z a tions. I n formation warfare and 
techn o l o gy · p rovide,; the necessary conditions for achieving 
vict ory ,· par ticularly agains t t he infrastructure, whereas 
t h e mil i tary technica l revolut ion supplies the sufficient 
conditio ns f or success (espeCial l y if a revol ution in 
doct:ri ne, concerning h ow t hese traff ickers are deal-: with, 
were t o come about) . 91 T~e Military Technica l Revolutio n is 
a new p a rad igm intended to faci l itate the military's desire, 
and necessit y f t o fig~t smarter and wi th fewer resource,;. 92 
I be lieve t hat we, t he U. S., can turn the tide in ou r favor. 
It will, however, take a revolut ion in doctrine which will 
ove ::::-c ome our traditional bias towards the use of "immoral 
9lArquilla, p.25 
92For a little more insight on information warfare and technology as related to thll Military 
Technical Revolution, see Appendix C. 
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acts." That is to say, we should not let ourselves get 
"wrapped around the axle" over taking down a drug kingpin. 
Traditionally the U.S. ha s been repulsed by the mere thought 
or suggestion of direct action against a "leader," but ho~! 
far must we stretch this sense of morali ty? A drug kingpin 
is not the leader of a country (at least , not in all cases) 
and should not be accorded the same fair and moral treatment 
which is rendered onto legitimate national leaders. 
b. Impact on Counter-drug Efforts 
(1) Hilitari:z;ation 
As evidenced by previous discussion, the drug 
war has indeed become militarized . The arming of drug 
cartels, and the scourge of drug trafficking overall, has 
had a negative affect on American society. Each echelon of 
the illegal drug industry, from the cartel's farmer to the 
pusher on American streets, is arming itself against it s 
enemies which may include their cl ientele, other drug 
traffickers, and law enforcement. The impact on society is 
obvious--increased drug related crime which tends to 
undermine and destabilize legitimate authority. Drive-by 
shootings have become common place in inner city 
neighborhoods. Warring factions of dope suppliers, whether 
fighting for turf or a bigger share of the illegal drug 
market, have spilled the blood of innocent victims 
throughout America. 
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The counter t o this epidemic i :lVo l ves arming 
the agencies fighting against the illegal drug industry 
(whic h has resulted in a militarized drug war). Cartels 
supply t he ir people with the latest weapons available, 
e n a b ling them to e s cape capture and prosecution by law 
enf o r ceme nt. Counter~drug agencies have responded by 
increasing t.~eir abil ity to exchange f i re with these 
f actio ns. However, the corresponding proliferation of 
a r mame nt in the drug war (as each side ups the a:Jte) has not 
signific a n tly checked the supply of drugs. More, bigger, or 
b etter guns is not the so l ution to the drug war. 
While initially tlle militarization would :Jot 
h ave fit Bush's use of force requirements , it has gone too 
far to be reversed. 93 It is too l ate for non - proliferat i on 
a nd counter ~pr oliferation would require more assets and 
93Reisman, pJO-3 1. The following quotes were pulled from a speech made by President 
Bush at West Point on 5 Jan 93 
Military force is never a tool to be used light ly, or universally. In some 
circumstances it TIIay he essential In others, counterproductive_ I know that many 
people would like to find some fonnula , some easy formula to apply, to teU us with 
precision when and where to intervene with force 
. . . 
Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and 
when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, 
where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential 
benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice 
. . 
But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and 
achievable mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.s. forces once 
the mission is complete 
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interaction than is currently being applied to the counter-
narcotics war itself. The U.S. may, in fact, have bitten 
off more than it can chew. 
This militarization of the antinarcotics effort [will] have little impact on the 
production and importation of drugs even as it [has already 1 embroiled the 
U.s. in guerilla wars in Peru and Colombia and fueled human rights abuses 
by the notorious military forces of the Andean region94 
Getting involved in protracted conflict with militant 
organizations within source countries not only goes against 
Bush and Clinton' s use o f force intentions, it is 
ineffective and counterproductive. 95 
(2) Legal and other Economic Costs 
unintended consequences of the declaration of 
war on drugs and the corresponding militarization of 
counter-narcotics efforts is that these policies may have 
thrown a wrench into U.S. cr iminal prosecution capabilities. 
The present convention shall apply to ali cases of declared war or 0'- '1ny 
other armed conflict which m<ry arise between two or more oj the .; :gh 
Contracting Parties. even if the slate oj war is not recognized by une oj 
them. 96 
94Hartung, p.137. 
9SReisman, p.31_ The following quote was drawn from President Clinton's inaugural 
address. 
\\'hen our interests are challenged, or the wili and conscience of the internationaJ 
community defied, we will acto-with peaceful diplomacy when possible, with 
force when necessary 
%Ibid., p.221. Article 2 of Geneva III Convention 
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The conven tion, the:J, applies to Manuel Noriega l'lh o a t th e 
time he c ame into U. S. custody was the head of the 
Pa na ma n ian Defense Force . When someone like Noriega, a 
convic ted f e l on and known arms and drug trafficker, can be 
considered a prisoner of war (POW) and treated in accordance 
""i t h th e provisions of the Geneva Convention, the system has 
gone awry.97 Massive payments were made to Norieqa so that 
the CIA could take a d vantage of his intelligence 
capabiliti e s and influe nce over other Centra l American 
Military leaders. Nor iega' 5 reward in thi s relationship 
( whil e it lasted)~ - in addition to the money, was a free 
reign to smuggle weapons to the Contras and drugs to the 
Unit:ed States. Not only did Noriega'S "services" cost 
American taxpayers a lot of money over the years, but s o did 
his prosecution and the appeals process (his lawyers 
a p pea l e d to the courts regarding his POW status) .98 
"Po lice [agencies] have shifted resources to 
make more drug arrests. ,,99 Tr.is re-allocation means that 
other crimes are not being pursued as aggressively, thereby 
ma king it easier for perpetrators of non-drug crimes to 
pursue their activities at reduced risk levels. 
97Ibid., p.219 
98Scott, p.65 Originally recruited in 1959 hy the Defense Intelligence Agency, he went 
on the CIAs payroll in 1967 
99So Jlars, p. 26 
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Another result of the war on drugs is, as was 
the c ase with alcohol prohibition, that the vice for illicit 
drugs has created a l ucrative market for the traffickers. 
Any costs incurred in production are, for the most part, 
passed on to the consumer. tOO If the cost becomes too 
prohibitive, the trafficker will cut corners and ship a bad 
product. The unregulated substances which then reach the 
streets are life threatening. Consequently, there is 
growing support for peaceful resolutions to the drug war . 101 
Negotiated surrenders would reduce bloodshed. And, should 
legalization occur, lethality of these drugs could be 
controlled and preclude unnecessary deaths. 
Armed protection for growers and traffickers at 
worst precludes, and at best inhibits, arrest and 
interdiction. In the Euallaga Valley of Peru, Coca growers 
are under the armed protection of the Maoist Shining Path 
Guerilla Movement . 102 Any attempts against t his 
organization, by American forces, will most likely result in 
a Vietnam style protracted conflict. The highest cost, or 
harshest impact o n American counter-drug efforts, of the 
looKonrad, p.63. "Given that the demand for drugs per addict is relatively inelastic. 
criminal activity strongly increases with price, and thus non-addicts not only lose the 
resources needed for financing addict ion, but also incur a lot of additional costs [such as 
those associated with medical assistance (if injured), replacement of lost items, and 




c a rtel's armament is the l os s of life . :n order to dista nce 
i tself f rom an active "combat rol e " on the "warfront, " 
Co r porate J e ts , Inc. - -the aire apparent to the CIA' s Vi e t nam 
War f ront company (Air Aroerica ) -- "was hired ta fly u. s. 
helicopter gu nships, transport planes, and crop dusters us ed 
b y Ame r ican drug ager::ts and foreign po l i ce officers in 
operations barred to U.S . military personnel, l ike raids on 
cocaine labora tories . ,, 103 Regardless o f whether they are 
well-pay e d civilians or the average military member, the 
situatio n created by the proliferatio n of a r ms is just as 
deadly . 
B . REASONS FOR FAILURE 
Why is the Uni t ed States losing the war on drugs? 
There are numerous opinions regarding the failure af the 
c u rrent drug war, but as different as they are from one 
a not he r, and although they are bent to pro ve some 
alternat ive approach (ie . legalization or mec.icalization) , 
they real ly drive home t he same few points - -that we are 
f ail i ng, that a change needs to be made in our present 
approach, and tha t the failul.""e is the result of not just one 
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thing but of many factors (which alone wouldn't seem to have 
much effect, but taken together have caused the whole effort 
to fail). Figure 3.6 illustrates this failure. 
Interaction Bar Plot for Drug Flow 
• Drugs seized C Drugirnports 
Figure 3_6 
As this figure clearly shows, the amount of drugs being 
imported by far exceeds the amount of drugs being seized. 
Consequently, the drugs are still being dis tr ibuted on 
American s treets and, even more desturbing, they are still 
getting into the hands of kids. 
According to Congressman Solomon, "young people' 5 
perception that drugs are risky is declining, and society 
has stopped pounding home the theme that drugs are 
dangerous." While I agree that t he perception of risk may 
be declining, I disagree that it is because society is not 
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putting out the d a nger message. As ment~oned previously, 
t here a.r..e. commer c ia l s and advertisements which preac h abou t 
da nger i however, kids are _~ a IDi~e~~ d ue t o 
mo vies and lyr i c s. Another part of the p roblem is 
c omplacen c y o n the part of cit i zens. Until recent years, 
communiti e s did not take ownership of c o unter - drug p o licies 
as related to them (therefore k i ds, as well as adult drug 
us ers , did not f eel compelled to abide by these 
polic ie s) , IQ4 
According to Arnold Trebach, a"Jthor of The Grea+ Dnw 
HaL., the u.s . i s losing the war on drugs because: ( 1 ) our 
d r u g l aws a r e irrational; (2) we de l ude one another into 
think ing t ha t certain dangerous drugs, such as alcohol and 
tob a cco, are less harmfu l than others (ie. heroin); (3) we 
do n o t h a v e the capability to manage a successful drug war ; 
(4) o ur l e a ders have declared all users of illic ~t drugs t o 
be "the e nemy ; " (5) the drug war does not deal with the most 
i mportant problems r elate d to drugs (ie. abuse, crime and 
c o rruptio n ); and, lastly, (6) hyster i a and hate are 
dominating the public discussion. 105 
I04Within the last year, communities in Chicago, Santa Cruz, and elsewhere throughout 
the US, have gotten fed up with dope dealers ruining their communities and now they are 
fighting back (by taking the dealers to court, or by suiing property owners for allowing 
their property to be used as a place of business for dealers) 
!05Trebach, p.2-5 
81 
It can also be said that the U. S. is losing the war on 
drugs because: (1) the White House Drug Policy Office has no 
real power; (2) not enough is done to discourage drug 
exporting nations; (3) the military is not as involved as it 
should be; (4) open air drug markets have no t been put out 
of business; and, (5) drug testing programs are not used 
widely enough. I06 
Regardless of how much money the government throws at 
the problem, amorphous objectives preclude it from 
succeeding. It is dif f icul t to know when you have won if 
the objectives are ill-defined or consta ntly changing 
(change in focus, change in attitudes, budget fluxes, etc.). 
Clearly, confused objectives lead to confused strategy 
(which also leads to failure in execution). It was in fact 
confusion over objectives which plagued t h e conduct of war 
in Vietnam. 107 Apparently, we are s low to learn from 
history for we continue to repeat prior mistakes. 
l06These points were drawn from the listing of William Bennett's strategy for winning the 
drug war which was entered into the House Record on 6 Apr 1995, by Mr. Solomon of 
New York. This "bold strategy" which Solomon believes that Congress should consider 
calls for government to "empower and demand action from the largely irrelevant White 
House Drug Policy Office; place economic sanctions against drug exporting nations; 
transfer control of drug interdiction to the military; identifY and dismantle drug trafficking 
organizations; block grant drug enforcement funding; demand some presidential leadership 
in the war on drugs; close open air drug markets; and, expand drug testing programs" 
l07Summers, p_144 
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Addit i o nally, policy- makers have difficulty in 
identifying th e enemy (is the enemy the people who are 
a dd i c ted to drugs or the pushe~s, distributors and cartels 
who make those drugs available ? ) i as mentioned in chapter 
II , th e re a re t oo many chiefs (too many agencies have a 
p i ece o f the counter - drug pie) -- "for every objective, there 
s hou ld be unity of effo~t under one responsible 
comma nder ;,,108 there are conflicting intelligence estimates 
( a nd the witholding of information- -between the CIA and DEA, 
for example)--and the National Drug Intelligence Center is 
underu tilized when, logically, it shou l d be the centra l 
intell ige nce gathering func t ion for the war on drugs; and, a 
lack of s ufficient prior planning dnd mobilizat ion (which 
causes poor judgement and poor ma nagement)--fai l ure is 
imminent if an "army" is cOTrUr,itted wi thout first committing 
the people ; consequently, it is important to mobilize 
nat.ional will when committing the government to "war. "J09 
Yet another problem in the drug war concerns restrictive 
ru l es of engagement set in Washington which tie the hands of 
the o n sce ne commander (if, for example, a naval vesse l 
lO8Ibid_, p_266 
1090uffY. p.18 . In fact, operation snow cap, ajoint US . OEA and State Department 
venture, meant "to provide armed DEA agents to assist pollce in Peru and Bolivia in 
search and destroy missions on cocaine processing facilities" was poorly planned. The 
DEA agents were not adequately trained for paramilitary operations and some of them did 
not speak spanish 
happens upon a possible drug smuggling vessel it is 
permitted to monitor that vessel but not board it--unless a 
Coast Guard representative, or other counter-drug liaison, 
is present)--"offensive action is necessary to achieve 
decisive results and maintain freedom of action. ,, 110 These 
flaws, along with attit.udes regarding drug use, mental 
sovereignty, and the scapegoat s yndrome, lead to a battle on 
the wrong front. Also, as mentioned ear lier, counter-drug 
policies overlook the fact that drug use and a buse is not 
limited to illicit narcotics. Rather, legitimately produced 
drugs also present a problem. (see Tables 6 and 7 of 
Appendix C) 
Two prime examples of failure in the execution of 
counter-drug operations involve the DEA and the CIA. Via 
"Operation Green Ice," the DEA laundered money for drug 
traffickers in order to collect intell i gence on the cartel's 
inner workings (insofar as shipping and trafficking methods 
were concerned) .I ll When rumors began to circulate that the 
undercover female was a DEA agent, an international bust was 
set (for September 25, 1992). On the one hand, the 
operation succeeded in arresting 19 2 cartel members, (they 
I JOSummers, p.151 
lllA&E, Ch35, "UnderCover," ~Ju..:ili.J.;"e, 6 Sep 1995 
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we re mostly f i nanciers ). On the other hand, the opera tion 
fail ed because cartel leader s remained iso l ated from t he 
money . 
The CIA exhibited p oor judgement and poor management in 
i ts attempt t o infiltrate a Vene2;.te:an cartel (I-lith the 
a ss istance o f the Venezuelan Kational Guard). Their p l an 
wa s t o keep t h e carte l happy , corroborate and facilita te the 
d i str i bu t i o n of illeg a l drugs by delivering it ':.0 the U . S. 
a n d al lowing it t o hit the streets. 112 This, they be l ieved, 
would ga in the t:raff ickers' confidence and l ead to va luable 
dru g intelligence on the Colombian cartel --particul arly 
informa tion leading t o -:.he capture of Pablo Escobar . In the 
end, n o va l uable intell igence wa s rece ived . llJ The worst 
part o f this operation was that at leas"':. 1000 kilos of 
c ocaine reached -:.he U, s, (fu!1ded by U, S, tax dollars) , 114 
Th e u se of pharmaceutical intervention to assist in t h e 
rehab i litat ion process ':s seen as a fai l ure because it is a 
v io l a tio n o f an individual ' s menta l sovereignty (since this 
treatment may preclude enjoyment of other aspects in life 
while it inhibits the pleasure created by the addictive 
Il lCRS, "The CIA's Cocaine," lill...Minutes. 
113Jbid , The Jack of intelligence was cited from a DEA interview, who was circumvented 
in this operation 
114Ibid 
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drug). In any case, these efforts have proven unsuccessful. 
Consequently, efforts toward medicalization, alone, would 
not solve America's drug problem. 
Additionally, "by focusing on the .o.b.j...ect.a of the drug 
war (the drugs and the drug traffickers), it is easier to 
deny responsibility for the c.~ of the drug problem."l15 
Although an effort is being made on the demand side, in 
terms of awareness and rehabilitation programs, it is not 
steIlUlli ng the tide. The awareness program consists of school 
lectures (which do not occur in every cOIlUlluni ty) , 
advertisements and T .V. cOIlUllercials (such as President 
Clinton's plea to stop drug-related violence--accompanied by 
a 1-800 number--or spots by the Partnership For A Drug-Free 
America--which are not carried on all local stations). 
Some rehabilitation facilities are federally funded, 
thereby enabling indigent or low income persons to get the 
help they need to "kick the habit." However, not all such 
facilit ies have adequate funds to help the growing number of 
addicts. Privately funded institutions are too expensive 
for the average person, thereby limiting their options. 
There are simply not enough rehabilitation facilities 
equipped to handle those who cannot pay their own way . 
l15Swisher, p_56 Underlining added for emphasis 
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.For their part , police agencies have increased the 
number of a rres ts of users aod street pushers and judges 
have senten ced increasingly large numbers of drug offenders 
t o pr i son. But there are not e:lOugh prisons to hold them 
a nd bui l ding more prisons requir e s mo re time and money thar: 
is c urrent.ly availab le . Besides f l ocking up the users d oes 
not c ure them of their habit- - it IT.erely takes a hiatus . The 
inabi lity to ge t the pubEc's "focus on the [ true] enemy a nd 
on th e political objectives t o be obtained by the use of 
force was the crux of our strategic failure" in Vietnan and 
it has been repeated in the counter - drug war.! 16 
Without meaningful, measureable, and achi evable 
ob j ec tives the government will never know if, when, or how 
they ar e winning. As Zig Ziggler (a :;totivat:..onal speaker in 
the 1960 's and 197 0 's) wou l d say, they don't "see the 
reac hing [ of a goa l ]." Perhaps this is why Cong!."ess wants 
to cut the counter -drug budget (yet another flux) , Granted 
it is increa singly expens':\'e to dea l with the problem , but 





At the onset o f the t.hesis process, :I was willing t o 
co n s ider suc h c o nce pts as legal izatio n and medica l i zation ; 
however, a f t er reviewi ng n"Jmerou s articles fo r and against 
the s e me th od s, I am not convinced that e i t her program is t h e 
s o l e so l ution t o the d rug problem whic h tear s a t the fabri c 
of o ur s ocie ty. While l egalization mig ht. me an governmental 
regulation of quantity and purity, and al l ow :TIore monies to 
be di stribut ed t o preven t ion and treatment programs (t::Jrough 
tax atio n ), it do e s not preclude the fact t ha t abuse will 
s t ill occur . ( s ee Figure 4. 1 )*#* 
The Magnitude of the Drug Problem 
Frequency 01 drug use Imlll ions) 
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Regardless of the prevailing attitudes toward illegal 
drugs, illicit drugs and controlled narcotics are not the 
most abused substances. As the above chart indicates, 
Caffeine, Alcohol, and Tobacco, all of which are legal, 
the most used (and abused) substances. Clearly, then, 
legalizing a substance does not preclude its abuse. 
Medicalization presupposes that the medical community 
is perfectly capable, and successful, in treating addicts. 
When the truth is that only those with the addiction can 
guarantee their recovery (and not all addicts are ready, 
willing, or able to do so). 
To even consider such approaches to the problem causes 
an individual to be lumped in with the likes of Pablo 
Escobar, Manuel Noriega, and others of that ilk (by the 
honorable Mr. Solomon--whose opinions are reminiscent of 
McCarthy and the Red Scare). This would seem to lend 
credence to Trebach' s belief that the government and law 
enforcement have stirred up irrational fears as a result of 
the war on drugs. I would certainl y hope that this is not 
the case. Some fear is healthy--in the right dose, it could 
be used to prec l ude drug use amongst potential new users, 
and casual users, and to reduce use among habitual users. 
The United States has not clearly identified the 
sources of the threat that the drug-consumption problem 
poses to its national security; instead, the American 
gover nment has merel y decreed that i J I ega1 drug us e is a 
prob lem . And , t he f a vored tact ic to fight this problem is 
to a rres t al l the users . 
The real enemy in this waf on drugs is not the American people; it is those 
states and organizations who combine drugs with terror in a still largely 
clandestine war against western societies, above all, the American one118 
The re is no question about it, a so l ution must b e f o u nd 
and s oon. 
[Narco-tcrrorismJ has no justification. It spreads only by the use of 
contemptible means, ignoring the values of human life, freedom and 
dignity. It must be fought relentlessly and without compromise,l19 
Since t h e U. S. is the ma i n target of Darc o -terrori s m, it 
must be t he l eader in solving the drug problem whi c h enables 
these nar co- terrorist s to operate. A proliferation of arms 
exist s a mong narco- terro:::.-ists and l aw enforcement, bu t an 
effo rt to demilitarize the drug war might well prove 
f:::.-u i tless. 
More time has b een spent on addressing the symptoms 
rathe r than the cause of America's drug problem. 
Consequent ly , a "cure" has not been found. Cl ear l y, supp l y -
side e fforts have failed to bring viable solutions to the 
third world 's poverty stricken-- f or whom drug crops are the 
mo st lucrative source of income. It is especia lly diff i cult 
lISEhrenfeld. p. 185 
119}{cisman, p.305 
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to resist the drug trade when a drug kingpin sets himself up 
as a town ' s, or territory's, patron-- supplying the quality 
of life items which would not have otherwise been made 
available . 
Derr,and - side efforts have failed to extinguish the 
d.e.s..ir..e. to use illicit narcotics which drives demand and 
makes the supply of these illegal products profitable--the 
higher risks (of arrest, injury, or death) associated with 
drug sales creates profit - sharing in so far as the street 
dealer earns more money when the product is successfully 
delivered to the consumer thereby precluding a l oss to the 
distributer . 
Failure to [identify the enemy, as well as the root cause of the drug 
problem,] means the war will still be fought on the wrong front, in the 
wrong way, with li ttle or no chance of vic lOry. )20 
The best way, perhaps, to fight this pariah, and the 
scourge they perpetuate, is to refocus on the demand side of 
the drug problem. Granted previous admi nistrations have 
taken steps toward the demand side, but they were by far 
outweighed by supply side efforts. The desir ed result of 
demand side efforts is a reduction in demand which will 
reduce the profitability of drug sales and thereby decrease 
the amount of dollars available for arms and re-supply 
(replacement of lost shipments). 
120Ehrenfeld, p.186 
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Attempts hav e been made to reduce American dependency 
on t h e ill e g a l d:::-ug t.rade, but not e nough has been done. An 
a dverti sement or commerc ial here or there may r:ave an impact 
o n the casual user o r the non-user, but does l-=-tt l e to 
preclude the use of illegal drugs by the addict. 
Cons e quently , more money shou l d be poured into the 
rehabilitat ion process. Judge James P. Gray, a Ca lifornia 
tr i al judge, would definitely concur with this p o int. Ee 
points out that rehabilitation, not more prisons, is the 
an swer (this means, o f course, that many of the present day 
and ne a r fu ture parolees will require drug treatment and 
aftercare--accor d ingly, they will have to be monitored more 
closely th a n past parolees--to preclude new drug offenses) . 
If ever tr,ere was a c ase for a war on two fronts , the 
drug wa r is it. Since narco -terrorism has been overlooked 
in the past , and, or p laced on the back burner for far t o o 
long, the United States can ill afford to ignore it now. 
Correspondingly , the U. S. cannot cease the fight on the 
supply side (where narco-terrorists presently prevail). But 
the demand side of the problem should not be forgo t ten . 
Mor e must b e done to treat the causes, not just the symptoms 
o f this global i llness . 
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The only hope for drug policy is a concerted effort of drug prevention 
which upholds the notion of no. drug use, drug interdiction, and drug 
treatment. If we soften our hold on an already vexing prohlem, we will 
[continue to] lose the war.121 
This requires, of course, that all drug laws be enforced 
regardless of their stringency. Because not enforcing a law 
renders it null and void. In 
This "war," t hen, requires many tactics which should be 
executed simultaneously, with the same impetus --no one 
program should operate in a vacuum--or the campaign will 
continue to fail . On the supply-side, more should be done 
to offer an economic alternative to the growers and protect 
them from the coercive tactics of narcoterrorists. The 
traffickers must be disassociated from political power and 
their infrastructure destroyed. 
On the demand-side, a new plan mus t be drawn up that 
allows for accountability (and must b e given the time and 
opportunity to work). Clearly, constant shifts in focus 
inhibit the potential of a set plan, or program, to succeed. 
Before focus is shifted, the program in question should be 
evaluated for effect. Another declaration, having the full 
support of government leadership, should be made. Community 
invo lvement is a must--when the community takes ownership of 
12ISolomon, l.Terald. In a statement given in the House of Representatives, "Drug 
Decriminalization in Holland has increased Crime and Addiction," 2 Mar 1995, p.E499 
122Meier, p.55 
94 
a p r oces s, they a r e empowered by it and are more successfu l 
as a result. !-fore effort should be expended on prevention 
tha n has been in the past. Treatment is important, but 
un les s more is done t o prevent new users fr om entering t he 
market , th e n treatment will fall even further behind the 
demand f or it. 
I n a sense, then, medicalization must be linked to 
preventio n and enforcement efforts must be l inked to 
community efforts. In the grand scheme of things, demand. 
ef f o rts must be linked to supply efforts -- the effect of one 
should enhance that of the other. In other words, ou r 
supp l y-s i de efforts (ie. penetrating a cartel to get inside 
information on the infrastructure) should not a l low drugs to 
be s hipped t o the U.S. and distri:buted on American streets 
this undermines demand-side efforts. 
What General Omar Bradley once said of the Si cily 
invasion ho lds true for the caunterdrug war as well- -the 
result of the mi xed form of planning utilized in this 
campaign is that there is 
no single [person] who could conceive the operation as a whole, impose on 
it [their] own imprint. see it through in practice and accept responsibility 
for the consequences. 123 
12Jmair, p.160 
os 
The standards in the drug war should be set by a third 
party and the measurement deduced by comparing reality to 
the ideal standard (ie. technical expertise). In this way, 
a citizen's group, or disassociated agency, could have a 
valuable role in determining the terms and measures of 
success in the war on drugs. This would, perhaps, serve to 
cut down on the politicizat i on of counter-drug efforts. As 
suggested by Goldste in and Kalant, 
one way to use technical expertise instead of politics to fonnu late more 
rational policies would be to apply the model of the FDA, whose mission is 
to match the degree ofregulation to the aClual danger [that] each [drug] 
presems.124 
We must also be willing to accept that "tota l victory is an 
illusory goal." 12S We can at best hope to contain or reduce 
American consumption of illegal narcotics , but we can never 
expect to eliminate it . 
In short, if America wishes to persist in this war, we 
need to : clearly define our objectives; properly identify 
the enemy; mobilize assets for both demand and supply-side 
efforts; make more efficient use of prior planning--
instituting accountability; eliminate the "too many chiefs" 
syndrome (by having one person or agency head up the war or 
by assigning explicit areas of responsibility for each of 
124Bayer, p.95 
12Slbid., p.93. "The pratical aim of drug polley should be to minimize the extent of use, 
and thus to minimize the hann.· 
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t he participating agencies); consolidate inte l ligence 
es t imates t o cut down on conflicting reports (ie. have the 
Nat iona l Drug Intellige nce Center collect and distribute 
inte ll i g ence to par ticipating agencies); reorganize the 
ru l e s o f e nga g emer.t so that the field commander's hands are 
no t t ied; stop trying to fight a war of attrition (wherein 
the enemy s ets the time, place, and natc:re o f engagement); 
and de-politi ci ze the batt l e and results therefrom (by 
obtain ing a consensus, from governmental leadership, on t he 
policies and proce dures o f the dn:g war- -to avoid republican 
versus de!llocrat a ccusations for fa ilures) . 
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APPENDI X A: CHAPTER I DATA 
This appendix cont ains t he dat a table and regression 
charts ut il ized f or data ana l ysis in the background section 
o f Chapter I of this thesis . 
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Table 1 
Data for figures 1.1 through 1_5 
119s1 pru9 import' !Dru9 0",- !Dru9 R".C"m,. ! ' oem' 
I~.~ ~ iil28 
~ 
_1OQO 12833 0.078 
~ 
~19_ ~1 r~ =%!= 
1992 0.24 920 189: 0.077 
., il. 
I 1888 0001 62.1 197609 0", ~ 




Data for figure 1.6 
DOD D3~.6 Bud_9~.~~ Mil. Involvement 1981 !R 1982 62.5 1272 0.049 1983 79.4 I 1537.8 - -0.051 
~~ 88.5 I 1900 0.047 1985 136 .3 2294.3 0.059 
1986 188.7 2466,1 0,077 
1987 504 4231.5 0.119 
1988 200.6 4317.1 0.046 
1989 503.8 6390.5 ~:  1990 799 ,' 9758.9 
1991 1042.5 10455.7 0.1 
199' 1226 11 151, 8 0.11 
199' 1140.7 11161.9 0. 1 
199' 815 10937.5 0.075 
1995 852 ,' 11 564.9 0.074 
101 
Multiple re gression analysis for the years 
1980 through 1989 
ANOVA Tatlle 
MIL. iNVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents 
[F Sum of Squares Mga.1 Square 
"egression 4. 143E·6 1.381,,-6 
Res iaual 4.238E·! 
TOla, 
Regression Coefficients 
MIL. INVOLVEMT .. s. 3 Independents 
tntercept 
DRUG FLOW 
PU BLIC OUTCRY 
~c:oe:"~iCj~e"~, ~S;"JE,!ro'~S'~d.~Cj"~"E'·V~"~"'~P~.V~"O~' ·002 -2.950 0600 1 .004 -1.575 2133 042 018 2.2dl 
Confidence Intervals 
MiL. INVOLVEMT vs. 3 Independents 
In terCept 1.914E-4 ~C~P'~ff~iCi~'"~'~9~S%~l~Pw~,,~,,~%~u~pp~e, DRUG FLOW 0/. DRUG Cf'.I ),1E 
PUBLIC OUTCRY 
Residual Statistics 
M;';:::OlVEM' ". '~'"d'P'"d,"" 
5S\"(i) - ,,( i-I ll . 1 . 
Durbin·Watson 
S"rial Autocorre!ation .: 
to2 
Multjple regression analysis for the years 
1980 through 1992 
Reg.assionSummary 




Adius,ed R Squared . 
RMS ResIdual . 
ANOVA Table 
MIL. INVOL VEMT vs.:I Indepeodents 
CF Sumo! Squares Mean Square F·Value 




MIL. INVOL VEMT vs.:I Independents 
Coefficient Std_Error t·Valua P·Value 
Intercapt ~~'~"~"i·'~~.ooI3t~'6~"I'I·'t~.'i"~~.'i"~' % DRUG CRIME ·043 059 ·338·720 PUBLIC OUTCRY 263 
QRUGFlOW 
Conjidenca Intervals 
MIL. INVOlVEMT vs.:I Independents 
Coeflic;enl 95". Lowar 95'1'. Upper 
Intercept 4_617E·4 ·007 008 
% DRUG CRIME .043 ·188 .103 





ss[e(;).e(I.')I . ' • 
Durb,n·Wal son 1_ 1 
SenalAutocorr~allon . 4 
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Simple ::egression .analYSis for the independent 
varlables Pubhc Outcry and Drug Crime 
Regression Summary 
p~~~:,O""" " . Dru~9 c~~' 
Num. Missing 0 
R ,;:lS 
.'1 Sql,;ared ,3-4 
Adiusted :=i Squared ,29 
nMS nesldual . 
Re-.: fEssiooCoojfc i:nlS 
~bliCO'CIj" O"!C"" 
ConfidefICelnlervals 
Public Outcry vs. Drug Crime 
C()effimml 95% lower 95% Upper 
Intercept I ·Ot2 1 .032 1 009 I 
DnJJC.1tne . 289 1 01 4 563 
Residua! Statistics 
P:~':' 0""" ". Dru9~c';m: 
#:<0 6 














If SumoiSauares ~::'lSOO1e ,:·Vaile .:l·VOfue 
~egressoo : j·8E·4 1.718E·4 5.489 ~1411 
m 
o 0 
.055 06 ,1)65 .07 ~i5 08 ,085 ~ ass .1 .105 
",,()ire 
Y ~·.a12 ·.zSg · X:R '2~ .354 
APPENDIX B : CHAPTER I I DATA 
This appendix c o nta i ns the data tables, charts , and 
some graphs, uti l ize d f or data ana!.ysi s , and graph 
generation, in Chapte r II o f t h i s thesis. 
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Table 1 
Representation of Public Awareness 
Table 2 
Most Imponant Problem Poll 
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Table 3 
National Household Survey 
T~nds in the percent of self-reported illicit drug usc 
12-17 18-25 26 & u 
1982 27.6 65.3 24.7 







Drug Use by High School Seniors 
Sr. Class E~, Past ear Past 30 days 
1981 65.6 52.1 36.9 
1982 64.4 49.4 32.5 
1983 62.9 47.4 ~ 1984 61.6 45.8 29.2 
1985 60.6 46.3 29.7 
1986 57.6 44.3 27.1 
1987 56.6 41 .7 ~ 1988 53.9 38.5 21.3 
~ ~:~ 35.4 19.7 1990 32.5 I 17.2 ~ 44.1 29.4 16.4 40.7 27.1 14.4 
1993 42.9 31 18.3 
Table 5 
1993 National Household Sur-.:cy (past drug use) 
Past Year [Past Month 
12-17 17.9 13.6 1 6.6 
18-25 50 .9 26.6 13.5 
-34 61.1 17.4 i 8.5 
35 & u 29.9 6.3 2.8 
J07 
COMPARING COCAINE SENTENCES 
I1:derai mandatory minimum drug sentetlCl:S a1'f~ based 611 
d~ weight In a law1hatcriti£s caD racist. crack cecaill!: is 
treated 100 times morr severely !han p1lWIItr cocaine. 
How the lOfHu-l f2Ilie affeds senlences: 
5-year sentenct 1iiI: grams 
III £fact 
• powder 
lD-year sentence Iiiliiii..sollOgramS 
NOlt: sentence is doubled if ddenunl has a prior oHellse 
RACE. ETHNICITY OF CRACK DEFENDANTS IHsc.a11 99,f} 
Blatt: 
Hispanic III 2111 
White !I 12. 




















National D rug Control B udget by Agency 
Adjusted for Inflation 
DOD Nail ParkSvc L.and M t Indian Affairs erritoriaUlntematiAffairslNS 
0 0 0 0 0 0.1 
3.6 0.1 
7.5 0.2 





315.6 0.5 49.9 
1543.4 02 48.6 
716.6 0.2 1.2 59.7 
800 2.2 0.7 63.4 I 
578.8 2.5 0.7 65.1 
355 5.5 0 0.' 04 67.1 
344.6 5.3 0.1 OA 83.1 
.. , oastGuard FAA ustoms Other 
~ /--!58,6 I 0.' 85 0 1982 243.4 0.' 91 .8 
1983 277.1 0 ' 79.8 
1964 408.6 0.' 147.7 
1985 422.5 0' 204.6 
1966 340.5 0' 205.2 
1987 488.3 0. ' 324.1 6.9 
1988 467.5 0.7 291 ,1 72 
1989 603. 1 3.1 409.5 0 
~:61.2 9.3 488.3 
1991 681.9 15.7 459.7 
1992 403.7 14.1 551.3 
1993 282.4 11.2 444.5 
1994 281.5 14 .9 452.8 0 
1995 266 6.6 412.8 ~ 
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Table 7 
1996 National Drug Control Budget 
Before ad'ustin for inflation Ad'usted to compare ""ith 1980 dollars 
eo, 
riculture 









53.9 Nail Svc Corp 45.6 I 
812 ---'000 687 1 
627.7 Education 531 
2396.6 IHearth 2027.6 
290.3 HUD ~ 245 .6' 
35.8 -----------'Inlerior 30.3 
586.5 udiciary 496.2 1 
6709.9 OOJ 567~~ I 1:~:: ~;a:~p 132.7 
,Sm. Bus. Adm I 0.1 Sm. Bus. Adm 0.1 ~Sec 202.4 1 ISOCial Sec 1,','0·. ', : 
State 213,3 ISlate I 
~ortation 371.6 ~rtation ., 314.4 1 
1",Tvl~A",~~"''"'''''I",iorl''------1 _ _ ~1O''''!14! .~I:l:~~~on +- 88~.~ 1 
929:5 ]\fA "~"36,:40 
I~Bud~ 14550.4 TTLOru Budget 
Table 8 
Percent Cooperation 
(based on DEA seizures with other agencies/ttl seizures) 
Years DEA Intera enc Coo ration I -TTk~ %~eration l 
1985 171888 74456 0.3 1 
1988 483355 187936 671290 0.28 
1989 659802 316082 975884 0.32' 
1990 886184 220643 1106827 0.' 
~ 7q~ 251957 I 956960 0.26 1992 669581 209478 879058 0.24 
1993 547800 120999 668800 0.18 
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Table 9 
Representation of Reporting Practices (Adult Arrests) 
~ Drug R~I.~rime TTL crime % Oru crime 
~::~ 4:;53 ~::.: -~ 
1987 811 10796 0.075 
1988 850 10150 0.084 Hi--t ~O:96 ~.~ 
~::~ ;~~ I ~~~:: ~ :~;~ ! 
Table [0 
Representation of Reporting Practices (Juvenile Arrests) 
Years Dru Offenses TTL Offenses % Oru Crime 
"83 57 1030 0.055 
198' 65 1034 0.063 
1985 76 1112 0.068 I 
1986 73 1151 ~
1987 73 1154 0.063 
1988 82 1164 0.07 
1989 78 1207 0.065 
lWO 69 1274 0.054 
lWI 59 1338 0.044 
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Table Ii 
National Drug Control Budget (millions) 
Adjusted For Inflation 
rre~~81 Int;:.~iOn Inv~~~ .~tions I nte~~~ona l Pro~~~t!2~ C~~ions Inte~~.~nce 
~ ~- ~~::~ ~~6 ~:: I 1~7~ ~:; 
r-}Ws-- !~~:; I !~;:~ I 9~:1 1~~9 ~;::: ;::: 
1986 636.9 460.4 126.4 150.1 221.5 3~ 
1987 1192.5 628.9 195.1 208.7 I 351.3 41.7 
1988 869.4 738 191.9 280.2 539.9 48.4 
1989 1381.6 920.4 291.5 373 895.1 51.2 
1990 1751 .9 1090.4 500.1 455.9 1780.7 I 64.9 r=-~-Jib m~ .~ m:JiliL :!tJ 
1994 1177.4 1477.9 295.7 719.2 1584.9 ~
1995 1127.6 I 1509.6 I 270.21 741 1797.3 275.5 
~~u~&ComRliance Other Law Research Prevelltioll Treatment I 
19.2 12.9 0 53.3 60.2 I . ~ 
~ 15 .8 0 47.9 75.4 374 .1 
25 20 0 56.7 96.2 422.8 
26.9 18.5 65.7 103 468.1 
42.7 21.6 0 78.2 121.8 521.5 
183~~2 ~~~:-;  52.8 12.4 22.3 271 .5 15.8 64.5 
171 20.1 77.9 157.5 426.1 796.4 
221.1 695.7 1101.1 
327.7 1238 1638.9 
320.4 28.6 ~ 696.5 28.5 185.5 
429.5 1411 .5 1791.3 
472.4 1440.7 2064.3 ~ - - 30 192 .7 929.5 29.4 256 
973.5 58 .2 562 .9 456.6 1426.6 2063.8 
1012.7 49.6 303.9 
1118 44.2 294 .2 
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Table JJ cont'd 





198' 2294 .3 
1986 2466.1 





1992 I 11151.8 










399,1 mill 14.6bill 2.7 
1278.4JJiIl14.6bili 8.8 
334.0 mill 14.6bill 2.3 
1843.1 mill 14.6biJi 12.7 
947.9mill 14,6 bifl 6.5 
Corrections 2419,OmiiJ14.6 bill 16.6 
StatcILcl Enforcement 1513,2 mill 14.6 bill 10.4 
;;,]a~Com [iance 103.7 mill 14.6 bill 0.7 
her Law Enforcement 339.8 mill 14.6 bill 2.3 
reatment 2826.6niIl14.6bilJ 19.4 
cvcntion 1974.9 mill 14.6bilJ 13.6 
esearch 570.7mill 14 .6bilJ 
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Table 13 
















Drug use by Military Enlisteds 
(percent reporting use) 
=:lliCl:: 
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Emergency Room Drug Mentions 
Year etham hetamineJS e PCP LSD Methadone 
1988 8992 12346 3835 I 2486 
1989 8722 16042 3421 3150 
1990 5236 4408 3869 2617 
1991 4887 3470 3846 2632 
1992 6563 5282 3499 2812 




















Emergency Room Drug Mentions 
~olUUl 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1992. 
• Drug Abuse Episodes 
Figure B.3 
Emergency Room Drug Mentions 
=1JJJ.1 .1 SE+OS + 4E+OS 2.E+OS 2E+05 1E+OS 
o 7 
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P!lGlYear Drug Usc by8ttl lnd 10ttl gunkrs {pcn;cnq 
8ltJgl'llldcrs lfllflgr<ldcfs 
0ru9 Tn c ,." 1992 1993 19!11 19911' 
IroIariJuanajHlIsb 6.2 1.2 ' .2 16.5 15.2 1!1.2 
IliIhllIaoI$ . .. , It 1.1 1.' ... 
LSD 1.1 3.7 . U 
OitIer Hallucinogens 0.1 1.1 1 1.3 1.' I.' 
CoeIIIdlC 1.1 .. , 1.1 2.2 
Crad:: 0.' 0.' , .. 
OUlcr Cocalne 1 1.2 1.3 2.1 1.7 ... 
Heroin ,.1 '.l ' .1 , -< 0.6 '.1 
StImulants 6.2 ~5 7.2 '.2 '.2 ' .6 
1 1.1 , . 1.1 11 
Table 16 
1993 High School Senior Survey past drug use 
Drug I Ever Past Year Past Month 
Marfuana 35.3 26 r~ Cocaine 61 3.3 1.3 
~ 2.6 1.5 0.7 15. 1 ... 37 
LSD 10.3 6.' 2A 
PCP 2.' lA 1 
Heroin 11 0.5 0.2 
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APPENDIX C : CHAPTER III DATA 
This appendix contains maps, charts, tab l es, and quotes 




u. S. liarijuamo "'= 
120 
ii~;~ lI:' 18 I c> 
_"" I;;..; _i _I i_I __ !!_I'.1 '!_11_1_ !! ___ l~_ I "'I 
J n :c 
z 
:» 






Illicit Opium Poppy and Opium Production Estimates 
(Uajor Source Countries) 
Net O~'loim Potential Oil' ""m 
C" · '",lO,", Vle'a. 
("e:,ar"s (metrlC !O"S,l 
'992 153,700 2,280 
Burma 
~ 165,BOO 2,575 
:l 1992 25,610 230 laos ~ 1993 26,040 '80 g 1992 2,050 
Thailand 





E 730 negl 
" 
Guatemala 
c 438 j 1992 3,310 40 
Mexico 
~960 49 
1992 tS,470 640 
Afghanistan 
1993 21,060 685 
~ Iran 






Total PotentIal Opium -==:< 3,409 




Foreign Military Sales Agreements (in thousands) 






12.584 34,070 16,689 15,183 20,877 
14)90 45,201 58, 11 3 31.4&4 21.849 
462 1,674 315 318 
864 4,965 
Foreign Military Construction Sales Agreements (1000s) 
FY50-FY84 FYII5 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FYn FY93 FY94 








8,236 452 93 
97 
INFORMATION WARFARE APPUCA lION 
Military Trc:hnical Revolution 
Information warfare and technology a cruc i al part 
of the ::.:urren t push t oward a ::- evolution i n mi l itary affa i rs, 
bu t is the Uni t ed States ready for this revo l u t ion? The 
l imit ing factor i n the Un i t.ed S t a t es ' achievement of t he 
"system of ;;ys t e:ns ," which is the core of t he revolution i n 
mili t ary a ff a i::- s, i s t he mili t ary ' s " abil i ty t o tap in t o and 
in tegra t e the technologica l accel e ra t i on underl<>'ay in t he 
commercia l sec t:or ." 12 8 (see figure C . 4) Allho u"h technology 
does n' l '~in wars, an advan t age can be ga i ned if ne'''' 
t echnol ogi e s and t ac t ics are combined in a creOi t ive manner . 
Tb~ Syst..m of Systems 
Rgme C. " 
SIlUrce: BlBker. J.,NAVl$ion,"p.8, 
128Blaker, p, 8. 
127 
I nnovat i on :"s the driving ferce behind the "Bys t em of 
systems " which is f ound in t hree technologies : 
digitizat:"on, compu:::er processing, and global pos it:"oning. 
Digitization allows compression , enhancement and 
mathematical manipulat i on 0:' i nformat i on prior to 
transmi ssion . 129 Computer processing allows digitized 
information to be man i pulated rapidly.130 And global 
positioning allo' .... s for real t ime, precise, location and 
t argeting of tang i ble ob jec ts ,l31 Battlespace a 'wareness , 
p i c t ured in figure 4 above , rel i es on the sens ing ar.d 
repor ting t ech::lOlogies of reconnaissance and intelligence 
systems; advanced C41 relies upon informat::'on s i fting and 
transferral technologies; and prec i s::'on force u se refers to 
action (which includes offensive in.forma t ion warfare) ta:'Cen 
based upon t he information generated by the preceeding two 
systems. 132 
With a shrinking force structure, the advantage gained by 
info:::-mation warfare is crucial to success in future 
campa~gns . The sooner the transition to the new revolut::'on 
in rr,ili t ary affairs is made, t he longer u . S . dominance can 
be main t ained . 
1290wens, p,38 
130Blaker, p.8 
13 10wens, p.3 8 
132Thid 
For, "today, the real risk lies in 
128 
hesitating, and t he real pay- off ",'ill go to tr.!;' bold, t he 
innova t ive, and the inven t ive . ,,133 
Current Capabilities 
What are our infowar capabilities? Teday's 
capabil i.t ic s consis t cf: hacking, comput er viruses, 
electronic j amm~ng, sa t e:"lites, unmanned aerie:' veh:,-cles 
(,-lith onboa r d cameras ) , spy p lanes , p"y-ops p l ane, stealth 
p l an e s ( ·'l iL~l precision gu i ded muni t ions), a suit-case s i zed 
dev :'.ce that g!:'ll erates a high-powered eleetro:nagne t ic pulse 
{developed by Les Alamos Nationa l Lahorato r y), Force Threat 
Evaluation and I/eapon Assignment system (a vir.tually 
QIl'Jliscient computer system ".,'h i eh converts r adar signals into 
a th ree dimens ional pictllre -- this enables a ba t t le group r S 
ad."ltiral to view graphics of both fr i endly and hos t ile air 
craft --and rr-a y lead to micro - mana.ge:nentl, and, i n June, the 
firs t class of sixteen infO'...rar off i c!;'rs gradua t ed f rom the 
National De::ense Universi t y ( t hey were tra:'.ned i n a bread 
spec t rum Qf intoylar tac t ics--from defendi ng aga i nst computer 
attacks to us ing v i rtua l reality to p l an ba t tle 
manuevers) . 134 
133Ibid., p.39 
134WalJer, pA l 129 
Future Capabilities 
Our future capabilties are also steeped in 
tec;'1nelogical developments. "By the year 2010 , the Army 
[expects to have digitized] t he ba t tlefie l d, l inking every 
soldier a:1d weapons sys t em electronically.,,135 The military 
will r, ave more sophisti c ated information precessing 
equipment ar.d smart weapons. Biosensers .... ·ill be used te 
sniff out the enemy. And ground t roops wil l have a hi - t ech 
helmet with components such a s earphones and microphones , a 
heads 'Jp display, thermal i magi ng sensors and nigh t -vision 
goggles ; all of which · .... ill enable t he warrior to maint ain 
cons t ant conmunica t ions wi t h other ground t roops , leaders, 
and t he area coordinators ; to be continua l ly updated wi t h 
positioning and intel l igence i n format':'on ; and t o maintain 
visibil i ty during n i gh ;: operat i ons ,1 36 
In the future , perhaps, " t he distinction bet· .... een 
civilian and seldier may blur, with more private cont rac t ors 
needed to operate comple x equipment 0:1 the battlef ield . ,,1 37 
I t is the risk .... ·e run as our mi l itary becemes increasingly 
rr,ore t echnica l . The ceunt er to such soph':'stication, 
however, is I"',ot itself sophistica ted or costly, "Much of 
t:,e t e chnology needed t e attack information systems is low-
\30 
cost, v>'ide l y ava i l ab l e, and just as effici e nt .,, 1 38 All it 
c akes is a COIEpu c: er, a modem, and a wi l ling hacker . An 
i nfowarrior is n o t readi ly i dent ifiabl e, and he/she need not 
be a rocket scient i st t o wreak havoc in computer or 
co=unications sys t ems . Dj s.::'upti8n can occur at any 
j uncture in the comrrmnicat ion cha i n (shown i n f i g '..lTe 5 
below ) t hereby making it difficult tc detect and counter . 
Accordingly , information ,",'ar[a:-e has an impo :-t ant p l ace in 
t he defence of cur nationa l securit y goals . 
Components of a Communication System 
Source -> Transmitter (signals - > channel) ---> Receiyer 
Figure 5 
138lbid., p.43 131 
Table 6 
Selected Dangerous Drugs Price Information 
Melhamphetamine (oz) $500-$2.400 $ 500-$2,500 $300·$2.500 
pcp (O l liquid) $100-$ 1,000 $ 150-$1.000 
L.SD (du)" $0.30-$3.50 $0.25-$4.00 $0.30-$5.00 
MDMA (du) $2-$20 $2-$20 $5·$20 
Methamphetamine (g) $50-$ 150 
PCP (1 cigarette)"' $5-$ 70 $5-$70 J $5·$70 
l.SD (do) SI-$t O $1 -$ 15 $1·$15 
MDMA{du) $5-$30 $7.50-$45 $10-$30 
Table 7 
Legitimately Produced Narcotics 
(retail prices) 
'" " " " 
COder .... 
$7-$17 I $6.50-$14 1 $6.so.$l~ $6.50-$14 Glutethimkle{set) H,_ 
S2O--$6O I $ 15-$68 I $15·$80 I $1 5-$70 (Diiaooid) {4 mg) 
P""'="1no' $1;$20 I $7.50-$20 I $7.50-$20 I $7.50-$20 T~{set) 









$-1 -$ 10 
$8-$30 
Bibliography 
Arquilla, John. "The Strategic Implications ofInformation Dominance" Strategk 
&Mew Summer 1994: 24-30 
Bagley, Bruce M. "Columhia and the War on Drugs" EOLei~ 67.1 (1988) 
70-92 
Bayer, Ronald and Gerald M. Oppenheimer, eds. Confront ing DOJg .~ 
in a Free Socjety. New York: Cambridge UP, 1993. 
Blaker, Jim "A Vision." ~eYOJ.u.t.i.un. Washington: JCS, 1994 
Brown, Christiane N. -The Rising use of Drugs by Teens: What Parents Can Do." 
G.o.o.d.Ho.~ Apr. 1994:19 1-192 
Converse, Philip E. "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process" 
publjc Opinjon QW!rterly 51.4 (1 987) S13-S24 
DuffY, Brian. "fighting the drug war from the trenches." I.LS.--,-'Jew£.&_~.ePQn 
08 Sep. 1986 20 
- "Now, for the real drug war." .u..S~.dQRepor/. II Sep. 1989: 18-20 
Duke, Steven B. and Albert C (,-ross. America's I gnges! Waf' Rethinking om Tragjc 
Cmsade Against DOlgS. New York Putnam, 1994 
Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Narco-Terrorism New York Basic Books, 1990 
Evans, Rod L. and Irwin M. Brent, eds. D.rugLegalilatjQn For and "gajns! LaSalle 
Open Court Publishing, 1992 
fields, Gary. "Battle over crack law intensifies." llSA_TudaX 25 Oct . 1995: 4A 
Gallup, George, Jr. "Public Opinion 1987." Ihe._GalhJ.p_EoJl Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 1987 
"Public Opinion 1988. ,. IhUJ:aUup P..oll Wilmington Scholarly Resources Jnc., 
1988 
"Public Opinion 1989" ~ Wilmington Scholarly Resources Inc., 
1989 
133 
"Puhlic Opinion 1990," ~ Wilmington: Scholarly Resource; Inc " 
1990 
"Puhlic Opinion 1991," ~. Wilmington Scholarly Resources Inc., 
1991 
"Puhlic Opinion 1992," ~ Wilmington' Scholarly Resource; Inc., 
1992 
--- "Puhlic Opinion 1993," I.b.e_Gallup_£clL Wilmington : Scholarly Resources Inc" 
1993 
"PuhlicOpinion 1994," ~ Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 
1994 
Gergen, David R. "Remember the Drug War?" II S NewS & World Report 18 Dec 
1989: 84 
Graham, James R. , ed, Non-comhat Roles For The U.S, Military Tn The Post-Cold War 
Era, Washington: National Defense UP, ]993 
Hartung, William D. ~llns_fQL.AIL New York: Harper-Collins, 1994 
Johnson, Joel "Financing the Arms Trade." :rhe..Anns...Ir New York: The 
American Academy, 1994 
Johnson, Bruce, et al. "A Day in the Life of 1 05 Drug Addicts and Ahusers: Crime 
Committed and How the Money was Spent." Sociology And Socjal Research 
Apr, 1988: 185-192 
Konrad, Kai A "Drug Policy and Federalism." ~ 80 (1994): 55-68 . 
Krause, Keith, "The Suhordinate Role of AIms Recipients." AmLu~ 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992 
Leavitt, Paul. "Drug-Smugglar Radar." llSA.I.od.a}'. 1 Aug 1994: 3A. 
Lee, Rensselaer W. Ill. "Global Reach: The Threat ofIntemational Drug Trafficking" 
c.w:wn.l:list9I):.. May 1995: 207-211 
Levine, Michael and Laura Kavanau-Levine. The Bjg Whjle I ie' The Deep Coyer 
Operatioo That Exposed The...GlA.Sabotage OfIhe D~r, New York 
Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994 
134 
Lintner, Berti!. "Special Report No.5 : The Drug Trade in South East Asia" la.n.e:.s. 
Intelligence Rl'yj~_ April 1995 
Mabry, Donald 1. The Latin A.merican Narcotics Trade and J T S Natio~ 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1989 
McAllister, J,F. O., et al. "Gening in the Way of Good Policy." Ii.me. 07 Nov_ 1994: 50 
McCuen, Gary E. Ih.e.Jn1ernational Dmo Trad~Contlil:.l- Hudson: McCuen 
Publications, 1989 
:\1cLenaghan, John R, director International Monetary Fund Statistics Department. 
International Financial St~arlm.ok Washington IMF, 1995 
Meddis, Sam V. "Congress Scrutinizing Mexico's Drug Trade." ~ 04 Apr 
1995: 6A 
- "USA Snapshots A look at statistics that shape our lives" USA.lo.da)'. 16 Nov 
1995: I(Life) 
Meier, Kenneth 1. "The Politks of Drug Abuse: Laws, Implementation, and 
Consequences." The Western Politjcal QTTartedy Mar. 1992: 41 -69 
Moron, Raul R "Bolivia The Psychology of Drug War." l"knlisphere 4, 1(1991) 
14- 16 
Owens, William A "The Emerging System of Systems," ~.dings _May 1995: 35-39 
Reisman, W_ Michael and Chris T Antoniou, eds, Ihe...Laws_of..War_ New York 
Vintage Books, 1994 
Reuter, Peter, et aI_ Sealing tbe Border.s~_~Dnc[eased Military particjpation 
in Dn'r Interdiction, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1988 
--- The Economics oCCrime Santa ~tonica: The Rand Corporation, 1990 
Scott, Peter Dale and Jonathan MarshalL Cocaine Politi!"s- DOlgS Armies and the_CIA 
in...C~, Berkeley: UniversityofCalifonriaPress, 1991 
Sollars, David L., et aI. "Drug Enforcement and the Deterence of Property Crime Among 
Local Jurisdictions." Mlic-.FioaO@ OJlarterly Jan 1994: 22-45 
"Police bureaucracies, their incentives, and the war on drugs" ~ 83 
(1995): 21-45 
135 
Suchman, Mark and Dana Eyre, "Military Procurement as a Rational Myth: Notes on 
the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation." ~OlllDl Vol. 7, No 
1,1992 
Summerfield, Liane M. "Drug and Alcohol Prevention Education" Erk...D.iges1. (1991) 
1-6 
Summers, Hany G. On Strategy A Critical Analysis oftbe Vjetnam War. New York 
Del!, 1984 
Swisher, Karin, ed. DOll' Trafficking San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1991 
--- Dnlg "hllSe' Opposing Viewpojnts San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1994 
Trebach, Arnold S. The Great Drug War: And Radical Proposals That Could Make 
America Safe Again. New York: Macmillan, 1987 
United States. Defense Policy Panel (OPP), Narcotics Interdiction and the lISe Of the 
Milit~e~.s.s.. Washington: GPO,1988 
United States, Department of Defense (DOD), ~QOL~ Foreign Mjlitacy 
Co~.n...Saks..and Mi'itary Assistance Facts. Washington: DSAA, 1994 
- - R.~t~.e~fD.e.fi:nseJ.~sllknt.aw:I~CJ:mgr~. Washington: 
GPO,1991 
United States. Department of Justice (DOl). Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
ll.S....lliug.Ireat Assessment' 1991 Arlington: DEA Publications Unit, 1993 
United States. Department of Justice (DOl). Bureau of lust ice Statistics "Fact Sheet 
Drug Use Trends." Dmgs& Crime Data Feb. 1994. 
--- "Fact Sheet Drug Data Summary." Dmgs& Crime Data JuJ.I994 
--- "Fact Sheet Drug-Related Crime." Dmgs& Crime Data Sep. 1994. 
United States. Department of the Navy (DON). NaY}' Doctrine PlIbJjcation..l:.....NiiYa 
:Warfare, Washington: GPO,1994 
United States. Govenunent Accounting Office (GAO) GGD-87-91 DOll' Smuggling 
Washington: GPO, 1987 
136 
United States, Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS). Nati.onaLMili.tary-S1ra~ted 
~, Washington : GPO, 1992 
United States, National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NI\'lCC) 
The W ee ReJXld J993 ' The SI!ppl}' of Il1jej! DnlgsJO the {lni/cd States 
Arlington : L>EA Publications Unit, 1994 
United States. Office of Management and Budget (Ol\..ffi), Dudge! of the Iinited 
States Gm:ernment Washington : GPO,1990. 
United States, Office of National Drug Control Policy (Ol\'DCP). Nati.cmaU2rug 
Control Strategy, Washington: GPO, 1994 
--- National DOl g COnIml Strategy. Washington: GPO, 1995 
United States. U.S Senate Review pfthe National DOlg ~ 
Washington GPO, 1991 
United States White House. ~~tY~tral.egy ofFnga gcment and 
En/.argement- Washington: GPO, 1994 
Van Biema, David, "Sweet, Sweet Surrender," Ii.J:ne. 07 Nov 1994: 46-49 
137 
138 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center 
8725 John 1. "Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
FL Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218 
Library, Code OlJ 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 -5 101 
Dr. Frank Teti, Code NSiTT 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, Calilornia 93943-5 tOI 
4. Dr. Robert Looney, Code NS/LX 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-510 1 
LT Mary L. Diaz 
125 Surf Way #316 




NIl VAL P,::S rGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY CA i394l-5101 
111lI ~llimllilll!rfrllll l l l l'l 
3 2766 00320056 9 
